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SHAME, REGRET, AND CONTRACT 
DESIGN 
ERIC A. ZACKS 
This Article examines whether contract design can influence the post-
formation behavior of the non-drafting party.  If it can, contract preparers 
may be able to obtain significant transactional advantages.  This Article 
suggests that several contractual features can be explained in terms of 
their ability to exploit the cognitive biases of, and to induce particular 
“advantageous” emotions from, the non-drafting party after the contract 
has been executed.  These features may include arbitration provisions, 
disclosures in capital letter or bold face type, “reliance” language, and 
language framing possible losses in particular ways.  Contracts can 
encourage individuals to feel shame, to blame themselves, to believe that 
contracts are sacred promises that should be specifically performed, to 
utilize faulty judgment heuristics when determining contract costs, and to 
rely on misperceived social norms with respect to challenging or 
breaching contracts.  This may influence them not to breach or challenge 
an otherwise uneconomical, unconscionable, or illegal contract.  
Consequently, contract preparers may be able to enjoy the benefits of 
promises that often would not be realized if the non-drafting party were 
profit-maximizing like the contract preparer. 
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“We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and 
endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us.  
This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with the 
eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct.” 
—Adam Smith1 
 
“[Y]et, now that I recall all the circumstances, I think I can see a little into 
the springs and motives which being cunningly presented to me under 
various disguises, induced me to set about performing the part I did, 
besides cajoling me into the delusion that it was a choice resulting from 




Contracts can be “experienced” in a number of settings.  Non-
drafting parties will encounter them at some point in time prior to 
execution, adjudicators may examine them in the event of a contractual 
dispute, and the non-drafting parties may return to the contract in the 
event of a problem or dispute.  If these experiences can be anticipated, 
one would expect competitive drafting parties to prepare contracts that 
attempt to influence the behavior of each of these different parties.  As 
profit-maximizers (and often repeat-players), contract preparers are 
compelled to engage in this type of behavior or risk losing to 
competitors in the marketplace.3  Such contracts may be effective in 
influencing behavior to the extent based on an understanding of human 
behavioral and psychological processes, including an understanding of 
human emotions and cognitive biases.4  Accordingly, the contracting 
behavior of non-drafting parties before and after the time of execution 
 
1. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 112 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. 
Macfie eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1759). 
2. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK: OR, THE WHALE 23–24 (Signet Classics 2013) 
(1851). 
3. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The 
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 726 (1999) (arguing that 
“[c]ognitive biases present profit-maximizing opportunities that manufacturers [and 
presumably all contract preparers] must take advantage of in order to stay apace with 
competition.  Whether by design or not, the market will evolve to a state in which only firms 
that capitalize on consumer cognitive anomalies survive”). 
4. See id. at 635. 
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as well as the behavior of adjudicative parties may be anticipated and 
exploited within the written contract with the goal of ensuring a 
particular contractual result. 
This Article explores the unique and important issue of whether 
contract design can influence the post-formation behavior of the non-
drafting party.  If it can, contract preparers may be significantly 
advantaged.  This Article suggests that several contractual features can 
be explained in terms of their ability to exploit the cognitive biases of, 
and to induce particular “advantageous” emotions from, the other party 
after the contract has been executed.  These features may include 
arbitration provisions, disclosures in capital letter or bold-face type, 
“reliance” language, and language framing possible losses in particular 
ways.5  Contracts can encourage individuals to feel shame, to blame 
themselves, to believe that contracts are sacred promises that should be 
specifically performed, to utilize faulty judgment heuristics when 
determining contract costs, and to rely on misperceived social norms 
with respect to challenging or breaching contracts.6  This may influence 
them not to breach or challenge an otherwise uneconomical, 
unconscionable, or illegal contract.7  Consequently, contract preparers 
may be able to enjoy the benefits of promises that often would not be 
realized if the other contracting party were profit-maximizing like the 
contract preparer.8 
Contract design may influence the decision-making behavior of the 
party that did not prepare the contract at the time of contract 
negotiation and execution and also influence adjudicators in the event of 
a dispute.9  This Article extends the analysis of contract design to the 
 
5. See infra Parts II.D, III.B, III.E, IV. 
6. See infra Parts II–III. 
7. See Samuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard Form Contracts:  
Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 199, 
216 (2010) (noting that consumers may “tend to perceive” contracts with unconscionable 
terms as binding). 
8. See, e.g., Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the 
Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 971–72 (2010). 
9. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage 
Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1079 (2009) (explaining the design of subprime 
mortgage contracts “can be explained as a rational market response to the imperfect 
rationality of borrowers,” specifically that “[i]f myopic and optimistic borrowers focus on the 
short term and discount the long term, then lenders will offer deferred-cost contracts with low 
short-term prices and high long-term prices”); Eric A. Zacks, Contracting Blame, 15 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 169, 171 (2012) (suggesting that contract preparers can anticipate and exploit the 
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context of the ex post behavior of the contracting parties themselves.  
Contractual features that may seem irrelevant to the business deal or to 
ex ante contracting behavior may be very influential upon ex post 
contracting behavior.10 
For example, this Article argues that contracts may be purposely 
prepared to evoke particular emotions from the contract parties after 
the time of contract execution.  Thus, one should identify and scrutinize 
contractual features that portray the promises contained within the 
contract as having a moral component.  The idea of breaching a “moral” 
promise might be able to instill anticipatory shame, guilt, or fear in the 
non-drafting party.11  For example, a contract may contain provisions 
intended to induce a party ex post to believe that the breach of, or 
challenge to, the contracts as written would be immoral, even though 
economically the party may be better off if she breached or challenged 
the contract and the party may have substantial legal grounds to 
challenge the promises made within the written contract.  By preparing 
the contract to reinforce the belief that contractual promises have a 
moral component (whether through particular contract language or 
features or the inclusion of particular provisions that reinforce the social 
norm of contract compliance, such as an arbitration provision), the 
contract preparer can prepare more advantageous contracts (even those 
that contain illegal or unenforceable terms) with the knowledge that the 
contracts rarely will be challenged.  Shame and other negative emotions 
are powerful, often unconscious or uncontrollable, and can inhibit a 
contracting party from acting in her best interest.12  Similarly, and even 
more problematically, given the depiction of the moral nature of the 
promise, the contract preparer can expect an adjudicator to be 
particularly harsh in judging a breach of such promises.13 
As another example, contract preparers may utilize arbitration 
provisions within all of their contracts, which are usually ignored or not 
negotiated by the other contract party.14  The contract preparer may 
 
cognitive biases of adjudicators (as opposed to the contracting parties themselves) to induce 
them to blame or otherwise feel a particular way about the other contract party). 
10. See Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 7, at 206. 
11. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathon Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics 
in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 406 (2009) (suggesting that “people 
are quite sensitive to the moral dimensions of a breach of contract”). 
12. See infra Part II.B. 
13. See Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 420–21; Zacks, supra note 9, at 182. 
14. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through 
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
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include such a provision not because of cost efficiency or the possibility 
of more favorable judgments (as compared with standard litigation), 
although such factors may be important as well.  Instead, the 
confidential nature of the arbitration proceedings for all similarly 
situated contracting parties (in each instance, the party that did not 
prepare the contract) may be the most attractive feature of an 
arbitration provision.15  Confidentiality regarding disputes reinforces the 
social norm of not challenging an unfavorable contract, whether the 
challenge is in the form of a decision to breach or to contest the 
enforcement of a contract.16  If contract parties do not perceive others as 
challenging particular contracts or particular contractual provisions, 
then they may be less likely to do so themselves.  By relying on social 
proof, or looking to the practices of others, contracting parties may be 
acting with incomplete information when the actual practices of others 
cannot be detected (because of the confidential nature of any 
proceedings in which one would challenge a particular contract).17 
Thus, the framework and formatting of the written contract may not 
be explicitly negotiated, but these and other features will have effects 
beyond the express promises contained in the contract.  By utilizing 
language and formats designed to induce passivity after the contract has 
been executed, contract preparers may be able to enforce or enjoy the 
benefits of promises that often would not be enjoyed if the other 
contracting party was a profit-maximizer and repeat-player like the 
contract preparer. 
The consequences of this critique are significant.  The result is a 
further distortion and undercutting of the model of contracting parties 
 
PROBS. 55, 73 (2004) (“[T]his study provides little basis for believing that consumers are 
making informed decisions when they ‘agree’ to arbitrate . . . .”); id. at 56 (“Perhaps most 
central to the debate are concerns that consumers do not fully understand the terms of these 
agreements, and that, even if they did, they cannot negotiate those terms, which are offered 
on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis.” (footnote omitted)); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. 
Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 173 (2006) (suggesting that 
“there is every reason to believe” that credit card holders will not act upon disclosure of an 
arbitration clause). 
15. See Eric A. Zacks, Unstacking the Deck? Contract Manipulation and Credit Card 
Accountability, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1497 (2010) (stating that “arbitration proceedings 
typically are confidential and leave a limited (if any) written record.  The result of this lack of 
publicity and public record can restrict societal awareness of any wrongdoing . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)). 
16. See id.; see also Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1672 (2005). 
17. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1672. 
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as rational actors acting with perfect information.  It can hardly be said 
that many contracting parties are aware that they can be induced to act 
in a particular way based on contract presentation.  Instead, contracting 
parties are just assessing the bargain (if they do anything at all) at the 
time of contract execution.  The results, of course, may not be 
problematic if everyone viewed (or did not view) the promises made in 
contracts as being sacred.18  The issue is, as stated above, individuals may 
do so while the repeat players (the contract preparers) generally do not, 
resulting in a disequilibrium where particular social norms are 
reinforced to the economic detriment of a subordinate group.  It is 
through the perpetuation of the norms of sacred or moral promise, and 
by evoking anticipatory negative emotions in the contracting party when 
deciding whether to breach or challenge a contract, that repeat players 
maintain the ability to enjoy the benefits of one-sided or unenforceable 
contracts. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II introduces shame as an 
example of a primary negative emotion and examines its relevance to 
the perpetuation of social norms that reinforce contracts as sacred moral 
promises.  Shame will also be examined in light of its effect, generated in 
part by particular features or formatting of written contracts, upon the 
post-contract formation behavior and decision-making processes of 
contracting parties.  Next, Part III examines how, in a similar fashion, 
particular cognitive biases and judgment heuristics of contracting parties 
in the post-contract formation context may be anticipated and exploited 
by the contract preparer.  This Article then addresses the implications of 
these practices in Part IV.  Part V concludes that the lack of 
transparency regarding contract design practices and the effects of such 
practices on post-contract formation behavior severely undermine the 
normative goals of contract law.  Without the awareness and critical 
examination of such practices, contract law may permit the creation and 
reinforcement of artificial cultural and social norms that do not reflect 
or address the goals of all contracting parties. 
II. SHAME AND CONTRACT DESIGN 
Contract preparers may be able to design contracts to induce the 
other contract party to experience (or anticipate the experience of) 
 
18. See Andrew Galbraith & Jason Dean, China Often Snubs Business Norms, WALL ST. 
J., Sep. 6, 2011, at B2 (describing how contractual promises have less moral significance in 
particular countries). 
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negative emotions such as shame.  Analyzing the emotions, internal 
beliefs, physiology, and behaviors associated with shame may enable a 
better understanding of the importance of shame in human decision-
making and actions.19  Shame is a distressing and difficult emotion, and 
the behaviors associated with shame or avoiding shame can help explain 
human behavior and, in particular, human contracting behavior.20  This 
Part describes shame from biological, behavioral, and social perspectives 
and suggests possible uses of anticipatory feelings of shame in contract 
preparation. 
A. The Shame Experience in Contract 
Described as “perhaps the most negative and disturbing emotional 
experience,” the experience of shame “follows events in which the 
individual violates rules of a moral nature that apply to core aspects of 
the self.”21  Shame is often understood as a negative emotional 
experience as well as a set of internal beliefs about one’s self or 
behaviors demonstrating shame.22  It is experienced as a self-conscious 
emotional response, associated with physiological and behavioral 
responses, to a situation in which one determines that her behavior or 
self would be judged unfavorably.23  This self-assessment is based on 
 
19. Tara L. Gruenewald et al., A Social Function for Self-Conscious Emotions: The 
Social Self Preservation Theory, in THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THEORY AND 
RESEARCH 68, 82 (Jessica L. Tracy et al. eds., 2007) (describing the “premise that has existed 
since the time of Darwin that shame serves an important function essential to social life”). 
20. As has been noted elsewhere, emotions have an “apparent immunity to conscious 
control,” meaning that “[m]ost people cannot simply change their emotional state by an act of 
will based on deciding what they want to be feeling right now.”  ROY F. BAUMEISTER, THE 
CULTURAL ANIMAL: HUMAN NATURE, MEANING, AND SOCIAL LIFE 252 (2005).  
Accordingly, individuals cope with their emotions with different strategies.  Id. at 253. 
21. Dacher Keltner & Lee Anne Harker, The Forms and Functions of the Nonverbal 
Signal of Shame, in SHAME: INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND 
CULTURE 78, 78 (Paul Gilbert & Bernice Andrews eds., 1998). 
22. Paul Gilbert, What is Shame? Some Core Issues and Controversies, in SHAME: 
INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21, at 3, 3–4; 
Jessica L. Tracy & Richard W. Robins, The Self in Self-Conscious Emotions: A Cognitive 
Appraisal Approach, in THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra 
note 19, at 3, 4–5 (contrasting basic emotions such as happiness or sadness with “self-
conscious emotions” and “cognition-dependent emotions” such as shame). 
23. Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 69 (“[S]hame appears to be a common 
emotional response to threat to the social self, the activation of specific physiological systems 
often accompanies shame responses to social-self threat, and these psychobiological responses 
are associated with specific behavioral reactions . . . .”).  In general, “social harmony and 
order are maintained, not by the subject’s feelings for others, but by the subject’s feelings 
concerning how they are regarded by others: the opposite pull of pride and shame keep the 
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how others might or do perceive the individual.24  Accordingly, given the 
importance of the social self to life success, “shame may be one of the 
most basic of human emotions.”25  Further, it appears that it is not 
simply related to failure to meet a particular standard, but instead 
connected to being perceived as “unattractive” in some way.26  Shame 
may then influence individuals’ “biobehavioral responses” to the threat 
or experience of believing that others do or will perceive them as being 
unattractive.27 
From a contracting standpoint, one can understand shame as being 
actually experienced or anticipated in multiple settings.  If one breaches 
a contract and is sued or is sent a notice of the breach, one may feel 
shame associated with the public nature of a lawsuit alleging that one 
does not abide by her promises.  Similarly, one may feel anticipatory 
shame if one suffers a loss under the contract: an individual may feel 
shame for suffering a loss that she perceives no one else as suffering and 
a loss that, if known by others, would result in others judging her 
harshly.28  Thus, it could be the anticipation of these shame feelings that 
 
rope of social restraint tight.”  J.M. BARBALET, EMOTION, SOCIAL THEORY, AND SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE: A MACROSOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 108 (2001); Gilbert, supra note 22, at 6 
(“Shame is . . . often defined as acute arousal or fear of being exposed, scrutinized, and 
judged negatively by others.”); Tracy & Robins, supra note 22, at 6 (describing how “[s]elf-
conscious emotions [such as shame] facilitate the attainment of complex social goals” 
(emphasis omitted)); Thomas J. Scheff, Shame and Conformity: The Deference-Emotion 
System, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 395, 398 (1988) (“[S]hame is caused by the perception of negative 
evaluations of the self.” (emphasis omitted)). 
24. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 17 (“Generally, shame seems to focus on either the social 
world (beliefs about how others see the self), the internal world (how one sees oneself), or 
both (how one sees oneself as a consequence of how one thinks others see the self).”); 
Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 68–69 (noting that shame may be experienced “when the 
fundamental goal of maintaining a positive social self is threatened,” which is experienced 
based on “an actual or likely loss of social esteem, status, or acceptance”). 
25. Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 68.  Accordingly, “[m]oral emotions [such as 
shame] provide the motivational force—the power and the energy—to do good and to avoid 
doing bad.”  June Price Tangney et al., What’s Moral about the Self-Conscious Emotions?, in 
THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 21, 25 (citing 
Jerome Kroll & Elizabeth Egan, Psychiatry, Moral Worry, and the Moral Emotions, 10 J. 
PSYCHIATRIC PRAC. 352 (2004)). 
26. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 19; see also Michael Lewis, Shame and Stigma, in SHAME: 
INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21, at 126, 
126 (“Shame is elicited when one experiences failure relative to a standard (one’s own or 
other people’s), feels responsible for the failure, and believes that the failure reflects a 
damaged self.”). 
27. Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 69. 
28. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 6–7 (“In shame, the self is both the agent and object of 
observation and disapproval, as shortcomings of the defective self are exposed before an 
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serves as an impetus to avoiding breach or challenging the contract.29  
Shame feelings may function to “warn” an individual that she will be 
“punished” through shame by acting in a particular manner, and she is 
influenced accordingly.30  Rather than actually experiencing shame upon 
a breach or notice of a breach, the individual may decide not to breach 
because she anticipates such negative feelings.31 
In yet another setting, one may feel anticipatory shame if one is 
contemplating challenging or willfully breaching a contract.  If one 
perceives that the group norm is to comply with contractual promises 
without question or challenge, then one may feel anticipatory feelings of 
 
internalized observing ‘other.’” (quoting June Price Tangney & Rowland S. Miller, Are 
Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment Distinct Emotions?, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1256, 1257 (1996))). 
29. Deborah F. Greenwald & David W. Harder, Domains of Shame: Evolutionary, 
Cultural, and Psychotherapeutic Aspects, in SHAME: INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR, 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21, at 225, 225 (discussing shame as “a 
signal that orients one to potential, but usually avoidable, negative social consequences”); 
James Macdonald, Disclosing Shame, in SHAME: INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR, 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21, at 141, 148 (describing studies 
demonstrating that “avoidance was associated with the threat of shame or embarrassment”); 
Marcel Zeelenberg, The Use of Crying Over Spilled Milk: A Note on the Rationality and 
Functionality of Regret, 12 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 325, 326 (1999) (“[W]hen making decisions we 
not only predict the utility that will be provided by these options, as assumed in rational 
choice theory, we also predict the emotions that arise from comparing the result of that 
option with the results of options foregone.”).  Zeelenberg notes, however, that “we may 
sometimes overestimate the duration of our future emotions and also overestimate the 
intensity of emotional reactions to events,” which can “cause inaccurate predictions of 
experience utility, and thus lead to irrational (i.e. inaccurate) choices.”  Id. at 333 (citing 
Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 
75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617 (1998)).  Perhaps, as I have argued in this Article, 
individuals are induced to overestimate their own reactions, whether by overstating the 
likelihood or impact of the consequences. 
30. Macdonald, supra note 29, at 146 (describing “ideoaffective structures” or “scripts” 
that “are constructed by individuals around various core affects, and the function of these 
theories is to guide the interpretation, experience, and reaction to events in one’s 
environment” (citing 2 SILVAN S. TOMKINS, AFFECT IMAGERY CONSCIOUSNESS 422 
(1963))).  The shame affect script is intended to assist the individual in avoiding the negative 
affect (shame).  Id. 
31. See Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 235 (“A premonition of shame, rather 
than an intense experience of the affect, can serve as a signal to avoid those behaviors in each 
domain that might give rise to a full-blown shame state.”); see also BAUMEISTER, supra note 
20, at 267 (describing how negative emotions operate via anticipation, as “[w]hen you face a 
decision on how to act, you realize that one action could lead to your feeling guilty, and so 
you tend to avoid that course of action.  Guilt [and presumably shame] can therefore exert a 
great deal of influence over behavior without the person feeling guilty [or shameful] very 
often, because people simply avoid doing things that will make them feel guilty [or 
shameful]”). 
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shame associated with actions that would, if undertaken, challenge the 
group norms (and result in public degradation).  The group norm, as 
described below, can be enhanced or depicted in a particular way 
through the written contract itself.32  Thus, “[a]ffects such as shame and 
guilt play a useful, even essential, role in guiding individuals’ behavior to 
match well with the values of their particular group.”33  It should be 
noted that guiding behavior in this sense does not mean guiding 
behavior towards the economically efficient outcome, although that is 
not necessarily precluded.34 
B. Shame and Contracting Behavior 
With respect to shame behavior or decisions, one who feels or 
anticipates shame is likely to act in a submissive fashion to “accept” or 
“hide from” the shame.35  As “an inner experience of self as an 
unattractive social agent,” an individual typically feels “pressure to limit 
possible damage to self via escape or appeasement.”36  Interestingly, 
 
32. See infra Part II.D. 
33. Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 226. 
34. See id. 
35. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 22 (“One of the most common beliefs about shame is that 
it motivates hiding and desires to ‘sink into the ground.’”); Keltner & Harker, supra note 21, 
at 78 (describing how “[s]hame is characterized by . . . the pronounced desire to withdraw and 
disappear”); Macdonald, supra note 29, at 142 (describing the “reasonable consensus among 
theorists, researchers, and lay people that the experience of shame involves an impulse to get 
away from other people, an action tendency of interpersonal avoidance”); Allan N. Schore, 
Early Shame Experiences and Infant Brain Development, in SHAME: INTERPERSONAL 
BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21, at 57, 71 (describing the 
“classical conception of shame as a feeling of being visible and exposed to the eyes of an 
Other, which leads to an urge to hide and cover one’s face” (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, 
CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 222–24 (1st ed. 1950))).  Macdonald also describes other research 
suggesting “that shame can have preemptive functions and, in this capacity, prompt a 
considerable range of behaviors designed to conceal and protect the self.”  Macdonald, supra 
note 29, at 147 (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
236 (1959); TOMKINS, supra note 30); see also ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE 
MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 7–10 (1963). 
36. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 22; see also Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 227 
(“Phenomenologically, shame has been described as a self-conscious awareness that one is 
being viewed, or might be viewed, by others with an unflattering gaze.” (internal citations 
omitted) (citing David W. Harder, Shame and Guilt Assessment, and Relationships of Shame-
and Guilt-Proneness to Psychopathology, in SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF SHAME, GUILT, EMBARRASSMENT, AND PRIDE 368 (June Price Tangney 
& Kurt W. Fischer eds., 1995); RICHARD S. LAZARUS, EMOTION & ADAPTATION 240 (1991); 
HELEN B. LEWIS, SHAME AND GUILT IN NEUROSIS 197–200, 202 (1971); Janice Lindsay-
Hartz et al., Differentiating Guilt and Shame and Their Effects on Motivation, in SELF-
CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SHAME, GUILT, EMBARRASSMENT, AND 
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shame and shame responses typically are accompanied by particular 
physiological symptoms or experiences often connected or associated 
with submissive behavior.37  For example, shame is often associated with 
a “rapid inhibition of excitement, a sudden decrement in mounting 
pleasure, and cardiac deceleration” as well as activation of the 
orbitofrontal cortex, which is an area of the brain associated with 
internal inhibition.38 
 
PRIDE, supra at 274; Tamara J. Ferguson et al., Children’s Understanding of Guilt and Shame, 
62 CHILD DEV. 827 (1991); June Price Tangney, Situational Determinants of Shame and Guilt 
in Young Adulthood, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 199, 199 (1992); Frank W. 
Wicker et al., Participant Descriptions of Guilt and Shame, 7 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 25 
(1983))); Lewis, supra note 26, at 126 (“Shame is best understood as an intense negative 
emotion having to do with the self in relation to standards, responsibility, and such 
attributions as global self-failure.” (citing MICHAEL LEWIS, SHAME: THE EXPOSED SELF 1–6 
(1992))). 
37. Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 69 (describing how “the activation of specific 
physiological systems often accompanies shame responses to social-self threat”). 
38. Schore, supra note 35, at 69–70.  It appears that “[t]he involvement of orbitofrontal-
vagal connections in shame is suggested by the ‘active restraining quality’ of this affect, which 
brakes arousal and triggers a ‘partial paralysis of outer activity.’”  Id. at 70 (quoting Peter H. 
Knapp, Purging and Curbing: An Inquiry into Disgust, Satiety and Shame, 144 J. NERVOUS & 
MENTAL DISEASE 514 (1967)).  These are different from “‘fight-flight’ active coping 
strategies,” and instead involve “passive coping mechanisms expressed in immobility and 
withdrawal associated with” conceding defeat, submitting to the superior party, and seeking a 
place to hide.  Id. at 72.  Similarly, particular hormonal levels and activity associated with 
stress regulation appear to be activated and affected by the shame or anticipatory shame 
experience.  Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 74 (describing the “empirical evidence of 
activation of these systems in response to social threat in both humans and other animals, and 
associations between biomarkers of these systems and shame experience”).  For example, the 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) system is associated with three hormones that are 
often released in socially stressful situations.  Id. at 74 (describing how corticotropin-releasing 
hormone (CRH), adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH), and cortisol are responsive to 
situations in which the “social self” is threatened).  Id. at 74–75.  The levels of these hormones 
are linked with submissive behavior in other animals.  Id. at 76.  These behaviors “are often 
considered to represent a primitive analogue of submission and shame behaviors in humans,” 
thus suggesting “evidence for a connection between shame displays and HPA hormone 
activity in both humans and other animals.”  Id. (citing Paul Gilbert & Michael T. McGuire, 
Shame, Status, and Social Roles: Psychobiology and Evolution, in SHAME: INTERPERSONAL 
BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21, at 99; Dacher Keltner et al., 
Appeasement in Human Emotion, Social Practice, and Personality, 23 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 
359 (1997)).  Another system that appears to be responsive in shame situations is the 
proinflammatory immune system, which is associated with (as the name suggests) an 
inflammation response involving heightened immune and repair response.  Id.  Interestingly, 
this system may be more likely to be triggered when others are present than when they are 
not, suggesting that it is an individual’s self-conscious awareness of others evaluating her that 
triggers the physiological response.  Id. at 77.  The inflammation response, which is typically 
associated with injury or sickness, may help trigger withdrawal in social situations where one 
has been threatened or dominated.  Id. at 78.  “Sickness behavior is thought to represent an 
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The purpose of shame behaviors is important on a number of levels. 
First, shame behaviors may operate to appease others by demonstrating 
an acknowledgement of wrongdoing.39  Such behaviors are informative 
(i.e., they demonstrate to the other party the current emotions felt by 
such party) and instrumental (i.e., the negative associations with shame 
behaviors can be a deterrent against improper behavior).40  Submissive 
displays or other appeasement behavior also are evocative in that they 
are intended to lead to reconciliation between the shamed party and the 
aggrieved party.41  In other words, the community will forgive, and 
refrain from acting aggressively towards, those who display the “proper” 
shame.42 
Shame can be understood as an “evolved mechanism,” which 
suggests a connection between the physiological and behavioral systems 
of humans involved with shame and those of animals acting 
submissively.43  For example, self-awareness, which is an important part 
 
adaptive complex of cognitive, affective, and behavioral changes that motivate organisms to 
withdraw from the social environment . . . .  Social disengagement of this type may also be 
adaptive under conditions of social dominance threat to decrease the likelihood of attack 
from more dominant animals . . . .”  Id.  Accordingly, this system’s response “in response to 
social-self threat and in conjunction with the experience of shame in humans . . . may also 
support similar disengagement and appeasement functions that are adaptive in such 
contexts.”  Id. 
39. Keltner & Harker, supra note 21, at 80 (“An appeasement analysis of shame 
suggests that the nonverbal display of shame (1) follows transgressions of social and moral 
rules that govern behavior and experience related to the sense of virtue and character, . . . and 
(2) is expressed in a distinct display that resembles submissive, appeasement-related behavior, 
which (3) restores social relations by reducing aggression and evoking social approach in 
observers.”). 
40. Id. at 79. 
41. Id. at 92.  Based on the prosocial aspects of shame, some have advocated the use of 
government-sanctioned “shaming” to promote or regulate behavior.  See Daniel M. T. 
Fessler, From Appeasement to Conformity: Evolutionary and Cultural Perspectives on Shame, 
Competition, and Cooperation, in THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THEORY AND 
RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 174, 186–88 (describing the advocates of such an approach).  As 
Fessler notes, the benefits of any increases in prosocial behavior arising from institutional 
shaming “are not free, but rather are accompanied by costs that . . . outweigh them.”  Id. at 
188.  Shaming sanctions may stifle innovation, for example.  Id.  See generally Joshua D. 
Blank, What’s Wrong with Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62 TAX L. REV. 539, 540–41 (2009) 
(describing the consequences of utilizing shame sanctions as part of a tax regulatory and 
punishment regime). 
42. Keltner & Harker, supra note 21, at 92–93. 
43. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 4; see also BARBALET, supra note 23, at 109 (“With the 
extension of the division of labor, and its consequent psychological leveling, each person 
might experience shame through the supposed regard of any other, irrespective of rank.  The 
conformity of all to a general moral order can in principle now . . . be achieved through 
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of the shame experience, may in fact have “evolved for the coordination 
of social behavior.”44  Shame behaviors may be an evolved response to 
particular group situations, where “submissive responses would 
(usually) turn off or lessen the ‘attack-mode’ of the attacker.”45  As 
 
ostensibly internal processes: the regard of others in the generation of pride and shame.”); 
Fessler, supra note 41, at 176 (describing how “[n]atural selection has presumably favored the 
evolution of the capacity to experience emotions that motivate animals to strive for 
dominance because access to resources (e.g., food, mates, refuge) is a primary determinant of 
survival and reproductive success.  Viewed in this light, the aversive shame-like emotion 
experienced by subordinate individuals is part of a motivational system that leads actors to 
fight for higher rank”); Paul H. Robinson et al., The Origins of Shared Institutions of Justice, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 1653 (2007) (“Once the intuitions [of justice] exist in a group, actions 
that violate others’ intuitions invite censure and punishment.”). 
44. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 119; see also Jennifer L. Goetz & Dacher 
Keltner, Shifting Meanings of Self-Conscious Emotions Across Cultures: A Social-Functional 
Approach, in THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 
153, 154 (“Emotions, therefore, have been shaped by evolutionary forces: they are genetically 
encoded and embedded in the human psyche, linked to biological maturation, and involve 
coordinated physiological, perceptual, communicative, and behavioral processes that are 
meant to produce specific changes in the individual’s interaction with the social and physical 
environments.” (citing Dacher Keltner & Jonathan Haidt, Social Functions of Emotions, in 
EMOTIONS: CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 192 (Tracy J. Mayne & George A. 
Bonanno eds., 2001))); Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 226 (“From the evolutionary 
perspective, then, the capacity, or potential, to experience the universal emotions of shame 
and guilt are hardwired into the brain’s neural circuitry by natural selection.” (internal 
citations omitted) (citing Paul Ekman, All Emotions Are Basic, in THE NATURE OF 
EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 15, 17 (Paul Ekman & Richard J. Davison eds., 
1994); Alan J. Fridlund et al., Facial Expressions of Emotion: Review of Literature, 1970–1983, 
in NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR AND COMMUNICATION 143 (Aron W. Siegman & Stanley 
Feldstein eds., 2d ed. 1987); Harald G. Wallbott & Klaus R. Scherer, Cultural Determinants in 
Experiencing Shame and Guilt, in SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
SHAME, GUILT, EMBARRASSMENT, AND PRIDE, supra note 36, at 465, 481)); Scheff, supra 
note 23, at 400 (“It seems likely . . . that shame has a biological basis and is genetically 
programmed . . . .”); Philip E. Tetlock, An Alternative Metaphor in the Study of Judgment and 
Choice: People as Politicians, 1 Theory & Psychol. 451, 473 (1991) (arguing that “[p]eople are 
in a fundamental sense politicians who depend on the good will of the constituencies to whom 
they are accountable”). 
45. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 5–6; see also Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 154 (noting 
that “given their highly social nature, humans face numerous problems and opportunities 
related to functioning within social groups . . . .  These are the problems of group governance.  
Self-conscious emotions like pride and shame have likely evolved as solutions to them”); 
Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 73 (noting how “[r]udimentary forms of shame . . . serve 
as evidence of the adaptive function of shame across the phylogenetic hierarchy.  Submission 
and appeasement behaviors in social animals are central to the communication of the social 
status position, a function that serves reproductive and survival needs” (citing PAUL D. 
MACLEAN, THE TRIUNE BRAIN IN EVOLUTION: ROLE IN PALEOCEREBRAL FUNCTIONS 
(1990))); Schore, supra note 35, at 71 (describing one view of shame as “the organismic 
strategy ‘to conserve energies and strive to avoid attention, to foster survival by the risky 
posture of feigning death, to allow healing of wounds and restitution of depleted resources by 
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acceptance within groups has evolved to be dependent on signals 
indicating acceptance or rejection, individuals within the group are 
extremely sensitive to shame signals.46  By being able to experience 
shame, individuals are able to comply with social norms (through the 
experience of social signals such as shame indicating compliance or non-
compliance with those social norms), which advantages them with 
respect to group inclusion and perpetuation.47 
Importantly, feelings of shame and related behavioral responses 
“may be against the conscious wishes of a person, who may feel 
overwhelmed by these highly charged internal experiences.”48  Instead of 
a “rational system,” shame appears to implicate an “experiential 
system,” which “seems to use heuristics, takes short cuts to reach 
conclusions quickly, uses crudely integrated information, is reliant on 
affect and how something feels, is preconscious, and possibly relies on 
earlier experience and conditioned emotional responses.”49  This is not 
to say that the psychological processes or requirements are simple. 
Instead, shame and other self-conscious emotions require that brain 
functions permit one to perceive one’s self, that others are assessing the 
individual, and that there are social norms that determine whether an 
individual’s acts are appropriate.50  To the extent that any of these 
 
immobility’” (quoting WILLIAM E. POWLES, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND HOMEOSTASIS: 
THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHIATRY 213 (1992))). 
46. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 99. 
47. Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 226; Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 82 
(concluding that “[s]hame appears to be part of a psychobiological system designed to alert 
organisms to the presence of threat to the social self and to support appropriate behavioral 
responses to these threats”); Tracy & Robins, supra note 22, at 4 (describing how “[s]hame 
mediates the negative emotional and physical health consequences of social stigma”); Scheff, 
supra note 23, at 397 (describing the argument that “shame is the primary social emotion, 
generated by the virtually constant monitoring of the self in relation to others.  Such 
monitoring . . . is not rare but almost continuous in social interaction, and, more covertly, in 
solitary thought”). 
48. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 105–06; see also BARBALET, supra note 23, at 
115 (“A positive evaluation of pride or a negative evaluation of shame has behavioral 
consequences in the form of a generalized outcome of conforming behavior.”); Greenwald & 
Harder, supra note 29, at 236 (noting how the shame associated with being unconventional 
“seems to evoke more a wish to be invisible in front of those who conform more acceptably”); 
Gruenewald et al., supra note 19, at 69 (describing how the “psychobiological responses [of 
the shame experience] are associated with specific behavioral reactions (e.g., appeasement, 
submission) to such threats [to the social self]”). 
49. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 16. 
50. Jennifer S. Beer, Neural Systems for Self-Conscious Emotions and Their Underlying 
Appraisals, in THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 19, 
at 53. 
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perceptions can be anticipated and manipulated, one’s conduct may be 
accordingly affected.51 
The discussion above is instructive in several ways with respect to 
contract preparation.  A reaction to a contractual situation (post-
formation) based upon feelings of shame or anticipation of shame would 
be advantageous to the contract preparer if these feelings or anticipation 
of feelings lead to seemingly illogical decisions by the other party that 
are economically beneficial to the contract preparer.  Contract preparers 
already should be incentivized to encourage passivity on the part of 
contract parties contemplating a breach or challenge to a contract.  
Consequently, negative emotions such as shame may be useful to a 
contract preparer given the association of such emotions with 
submissive behavior.  If contracts can help communicate the experience 
(actual or anticipated) of shame to the other contracting party, the 
contract preparer may be able to enjoy a higher level of contract 
compliance than might otherwise be experienced. 
An individual may avoid help-seeking behavior, such as sharing her 
contractual situation with others, because she is scared of feeling shame 
once her situation is known.52  If one believes she is worthy of shame, 
either because of her past or contemplated actions, then she will 
acquiesce to the superior party, avoid sharing her shame with others, 
and avoid actions that may trigger future shame feelings.53  In 
 
51. See LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: 
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 30 (2011). 
52. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 23–24. 
53. The reactions and behaviors associated with negative emotional states are not 
perfectly predictable or divisible, of course.  Humiliation, for example, may be considered 
close to shame and overlap in some instances.  Some believe, however, that humiliation is 
more directly related to an unjust exercise of power by one over another “purely for [one’s] 
own pleasure or purpose.”  Id. at 9–10; see also Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 
412 (noting that “people might also be more averse to losses coming from someone who has 
promised to confer a benefit (e.g., a promisor) than from someone with a neutral status (a 
negligent tortfeasor),” suggesting that contract preparers perhaps should be inclined to 
position themselves as benevolent promisors who did all they could to help the other 
contracting party rather than harsh-promise enforcers who may be seen as humiliating or 
unaccommodating to the other contracting party).  If one feels humiliation as opposed to 
shame, then one’s behaviors accordingly may be difficult, as “people believe they deserve 
their shame; they do not believe they deserve their humiliation.”  Gilbert, supra note 22, at 10 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Donald C. Klein, The Humiliation Dynamic: An Overview, 12 J. 
PRIMARY PREVENTION 93, 117 (1991)).  If humiliated, individuals may respond with “rageful 
anger.”  Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 236.  Thus, if a contractual outcome is 
perceived as being “humiliating” versus “shaming,” then the suffering party may choose to 
challenge or, at least, not to comply with the contract.  By way of contrast, with humiliation, 
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contractual terms, she may not contest enforcement of the contract, 
strategically default, consult an attorney, or otherwise publicize her 
situation.54 
As will be discussed below, contracts appear to have features 
designed to trigger shame or the anticipation of shame, whether through 
the reinforcement of social norms regarding compliance,55 the inclusion 
of legal language that triggers deference,56 or language that implicates 
the immoral nature of a breach.57 
C. Shame, Contract, and Moral Promises 
This Article suggests that an individual’s perception that a contract 
has a “moral” component is important to a self-evaluation of 
attractiveness (and avoiding possibly feeling shame) when determining 
whether to breach or challenge a written contract.  Thus, it is not merely 
the act of contractual breach or the situation of suffering damages alone 
that results in shame, but it is also the personal belief that one does not 
want to be publicly associated with the breach of a “moral” promise and 
 
one perceives that the other party (the “humiliator”) is the cause of the problem, resulting in 
a desire for revenge.  Gilbert, supra note 22, at 10 (“Humiliation involves: (1) a focus on the 
other as bad rather than the self; (2) external rather than internal attributions for harmful 
events; (3) a sense of injustice and unfairness; and (4) a burning desire for revenge.”).  If, for 
example, the contract terms are presented (perhaps hidden) in a manner that is perceived to 
be unfair, then perhaps the other party will feel as though the contract preparer was 
exercising power unfairly.  See id.  For example, White notes how “strategic defaulters [of 
home mortgages] tend to direct most of the blame, and thus their anger, toward financial 
institutions and the government for causing, or allowing, the housing meltdown.”  Brent T. 
White, Take this House and Shove it: The Emotional Drivers of Strategic Default, 63 SMU L. 
REV. 1279, 1305 (2010).  Their “anger is only compounded by the sense that their lenders are 
giving them the runaround, being callous and uncaring, looking out only for their own 
economic self-interest, and refusing to help despite being bailed out by taxpayers 
themselves,” and “[t]his anger turns out to be cathartic for many strategic defaulters, relieving 
their guilt and justifying a tit-for-tat response to banks.”  Id. at 1305–06 (footnotes omitted).  
Had lenders been able to alleviate some of this anger (or possibly preclude it through a 
different contract), perhaps the incidence of strategic default on home mortgages would have 
been lower.  If the contract preparer is perceived to be humiliating the other party or 
otherwise deemed to be the cause of the unfortunate contract situation, then the other 
contracting party’s emotions, beliefs, and behaviors may be different.  Thus, this Article 
distinguishes between contractual features that may be employed towards a shame-based 
reaction, rather than a humiliation-based reaction or other reactions involving an external 
attribution of causation. 
54. The avoidance of publicity, of course, reinforces social proof regarding contract 
compliance.  See infra Part II.D. 
55. See infra Part II.D. 
56. See infra Part II.D. 
57. See infra Part II.C. 
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is struggling to avoid that association.58 
As seen above, whether one perceives her particular trait or act as 
undesirable will depend on the particular social and cultural context in 
which the decision is being made.59  The shame “experience” may vary 
“[t]o the extent that cultures vary in self-evaluative processes, in the 
structure of relationships, or in terms of the values individuals 
chronically evaluate themselves against.”60  Thus, “[i]t is likely that what 
is undesirable about the self is as much open to social and cultural 
constructions as what is desirable.”61  An individual will feel differently 
about her contract breach in a culture that values contract compliance as 
a moral virtue versus one in which contract compliance is compelled or 
demanded only by economic necessity or efficiency.62  This may explain, 
for example, the differing cultural beliefs about the morality of the 
promises contained in a written contract.63  Contract preparers have a 
 
58. See Fessler, supra note 41, at 181 (“The aversive nature of shame provides an 
anticipatory incentive to conform to cultural standards, and to be cognizant of the extent to 
which others are aware of any digressions.”); Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 166 (“Self-
conscious emotions, in particular shame, guilt, and forms of pride, are intimately intertwined 
with moral judgments of harm, character, and responsibility.”). 
59. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 118 (noting that “it is not always the case that 
traits and behaviors that are stigmatized by one group will result in shame. . . .  Tolerance 
might relate to group identification—the judgments of others with whom we are, or desire to 
be, in close contact may be more powerful”). 
60. Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 153; see also ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 51, at 
30 (describing Sherif’s experiments and his conclusions that “in the face of uncertainty or 
ambiguity people give weight to the judgments of their peers,” but, perhaps more 
importantly, “our most basic perceptions and judgments about the world are socially 
conditioned and dictated” (citing Muzafer Sherif, An Experimental Approach to the Study of 
Attitudes, 1  SOCIOMETRY 90 (1937))); Galbraith & Dean, supra note 18, at B2. 
61. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 19; see also Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 118 
(noting that “for internalized shame to occur the person has to accept the negative judgments 
of others as both true in some measure and undesired”); Lewis, supra note 26, at 126 (“Shame 
is elicited when one experiences failure relative to a standard (one’s own or other people’s), 
feels responsible for the failure, and believes that the failure reflects a damaged self.”); 
Scheff, supra note 23, at 400 (“For adults . . . it also seems certain that shame is not only a 
biological process, but also an overwhelmingly social and cultural phenomenon.”). 
62. Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 154 (describing how “self-conscious emotions 
serve to help the individual act according to group norms, and these group norms vary greatly 
across cultures,” which results “in variation in the specific events that tend to elicit self-
conscious emotions, in the elaborate concepts around particular self-conscious emotions, and 
in the functional value and normative beliefs associated with self-conscious emotions”). 
63. Galbraith & Dean, supra note 18 (describing how contractual promises have less 
moral significance in particular countries); see also Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 167 
(describing a study in which “Chinese participants were less likely to mention violations of 
social laws and moral principles as determinants of guilt and shame than were U.S. 
participants” (citing Deborah Stipek et al., Testing Some Attribution—Emotion Relations in 
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stake in this cultural construction and preparation of the contract to 
reinforce the contract as moral promise (or other group norm 
incentivizing contract compliance or deference) is one way in which 
their responses to this incentive can be examined. 
Shavell has described the widely held “view that there is something 
wrong with a person’s breaking a contract, or, equivalently, that a 
person ought to meet his or her contractual obligations.”64  As an 
example, he cites the Restatement of Contracts, which refers to the 
“sanctity of contract and the resulting moral obligation to honor one’s 
promises.”65  Contractual promises are seen “as close to, or as even 
 
the People’s Republic of China, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 109 (1989))).  Goetz 
and Keltner theorize that “members of different cultures should vary in the extent to which 
they ‘moralize’ self-conscious emotions, that is, consider them matters of right and wrong, and 
as implicating punishment or sanctions.”  Id. 
64. Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 439 (2006); 
Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 406 (“Most people agree that breaking a promise 
is immoral.  Because the legal construct of contract is tied so closely to the moral notion of a 
promise, breach of contract would seem to fall into the same category of moral harm as a 
broken promise.”); see also Brent T. White, The Morality of Strategic Default, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. DISCOURSE 155, 157 (2010), available at http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/discourse/58-
8.pdf (describing one of the primary arguments against strategic default of home mortgages, 
which is that “homeowners promised to pay their mortgages when they signed the mortgage 
contract, and it would be immoral to break this promise”); Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of 
Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551, 1552 (2009) (noting that breaching behavior, 
particularly efficient breaches, “is condemned by morality,” and that “[a]lthough the law need 
not enforce morality as such, it is problematic when the law, either directly, or by way of the 
justifications underlying the law, embraces and encourages immoral action”).  Shiffrin goes 
on to suggest that “breach of contract may be immoral . . . because it disrespects two features 
of the moral significance of agreements,” namely the fact that the parties may especially 
prefer (or be motivated by the prospect of) performance and the actual agreement provided 
by parties (that is, “the background structure that required agreement as a prerequisite to 
performance presupposed that performance could not be demanded upon the proffer of the 
performer’s going rate. . . .  [I]t matters whether or not she in fact agrees”).  Id. at 1566–67.  
The disagreement about strategic default illustrates “the failure of either morality or 
efficiency as a unifying descriptive or normative theory. . . .  The parties’ respective arguments 
demonstrate that the question whether a breach of contract is immoral is more sophisticated 
than simply asking if someone reneged on a promise.”  Meredith R. Miller, Strategic Default: 
The Popularization of a Debate Among Contract Scholars, 9 CORNELL REAL EST. REV. 32, 
42 (2011). 
65. Shavell, supra note 64, at 439–40 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also CHARLES 
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 40 (1981) 
(arguing that contracts are “grounded in the primitive moral institution of promising”); 
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected 
Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and Nonperformance, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1428 
(2009) (“It is therefore tempting to reach the conclusion that liability in contract for 
nonperformance is strict, and is based on policy reasons rather than moral reasons. . . .  In the 
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indistinguishable from, promises made in every day life,” and those 
“promises are statements that most people think they have a moral 
obligation to honor.”66  Despite these moral proclamations, contract law 
typically permits breach, in the sense that promises made are not 
generally required to be specifically performed.67  Instead, contract law 
typically allows a person to breach a contract and pay monetary 
damages arising from that breach rather than being required to 
specifically perform the contractual promises.68  Put in terms of a 
 
area of nonperformance, law and morality, although not identical, tend to converge rather 
than diverge.”).  Eisenberg argues that “[t]he efficiency of [the contracting] system rests on a 
tripod whose legs are legal remedies, reputational effects, and the internalization of social 
norms—in particular, the moral norm of promise keeping.  These three legs are mutually 
supportive.”  Id. at 1430.  But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 153 
(5th ed. 1998) (arguing that contract law should not generally be used “to enforce moral 
(insofar as they may be distinct from economic) principles”). 
66. Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the 
Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1579 (2009).  Shavell suggests that 
“[w]e are taught from childhood that our promises ought to be kept, and this view is 
reinforced throughout our lives,” and, accordingly, “it is natural for us to identify contracts 
with the promises that we have learned to treat as having moral valence.”  Id. 
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (“The traditional 
goal of the law of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the promisor to perform his 
promise but compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from breach.”); Wilkinson-
Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 406 (noting that “[t]he penalty for breach of contract is 
limited, with some exceptions, to money damages in the amount necessary to put the 
nonbreaching party in as good a position as he or she would have been in had the contract 
been performed” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347)); see also Shavell, 
supra note 64, at 440 (noting that “it is manifest that contracts are often disobeyed and that 
the law permits this without the imposition of rigorous sanctions”); Shavell, supra note 66, at 
1579 (noting that individuals “do not pause to consider that contracts are in fact different 
from promises made in social intercourse, and that breaking contracts, unlike breaking 
promises, results in the payment of damages”).  Moreover, the “moral” nature of contractual 
promises is often invoked only when talking about individuals as opposed to corporate or 
other entity behavior.  See White, supra note 64, at 163 (asking “[w]hy also speak of morality 
and social responsibility only when talking about strategic default by homeowners and not by 
financial institutions or large corporations”).  White suggests that, “if anything, the difference 
between commercial and residential mortgage contracts cuts in the other direction—and we 
should be more forgiving of less sophisticated residential borrowers.”  Id. at 164. 
68. See Shavell, supra note 64, at 440 (noting how “[t]he Restatement and commentators 
seem to be of the opinion that breach and payment of damages generally are tolerable, and 
sometimes even desirable, for practical, economic reasons”); White, supra note 64, at 157 
(arguing that “a mortgage contract, like all other contracts, is purely a legal document, not a 
sacred promise”); Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 406 (noting that “the law does 
not explicitly recognize the moral context of breach of contract. . . .  This means that there are 
no legal distinctions between cases that elicit very different moral intuitions; morally salient 
factors like the motives and intentions of the breacher are legally irrelevant”).  Indeed, 
Shavell notes that some commentators, such as Holmes, “seemed almost to celebrate the 
option to commit breach despite its negative moral aspect.”  Shavell, supra note 64, at 440 
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mortgage contract, “the lender has contemplated in advance that the 
mortgagor might be unable or unwilling to continue making payments 
on his mortgage at some point—and has decided in advance what fair 
compensation would be” and “wrote that compensation into the 
contract.”69  Indeed, in an economic sense, a breach may be a preferred 
course of action under certain circumstances.70  If the breaching party 
would be benefited more by the breach than the other party will be 
harmed, then it would be “efficient” for the breach to occur.71 
Regardless, people in the U.S. generally view breach as an immoral 
act.72  Indeed, “most individuals react to breach . . . as having an ethically 
 
(noting Holmes’ idea that “[t]he duty to keep a contract . . . means a prediction that you must 
pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else . . . .  But such a mode of looking at the 
matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the 
law as they can” (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV 
457, 462 (1897))); see also Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 406 (noting that “[n]ot 
only does our legal system appear indifferent to the moral harm of promise breaking, it 
permits breachers to profit from a moral violation”).  Shavell, though, believes that Holmes 
was not ascribing an “ethically neutral” status to a breach, but rather was trying to describe 
the treatment of breach under the law.  Shavell, supra note 64, at 457.  Shavell believes that 
Holmes would have believed such an act to be immoral, or at least that “we have no reason to 
think that he would not consider it so.”  Id.  But see Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a 
Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (2009) (describing Holmes’ theory of 
contract as being a “no fault” theory, which suggests that a “‘breach’ is therefore not a 
wrongful act”).  Posner suggests that “[t]he law uses moral language mainly because it 
supplies a familiar vocabulary in which to discuss duties and entitlements and thus provides 
continuity between legal language and the language of everyday life.  To take it literally is a 
common source of mistakes in legal thinking.”  Id. at 1357. 
69. White, supra 64, at 158.  White articulates that “it’s simplistic to suggest that it’s 
always immoral to break a promise.  A more accurate description of the social norm is that 
one should keep one’s promises unless one has a compelling enough reason not to do so.”  Id. 
at 159.  As argued in this Article, though, contract prepares are incentivized to reinforce the 
“simplistic” view of the social norm as all contractual promises are sacrosanct. 
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (“In general, therefore, 
a party may find it advantageous to refuse to perform a contract if he will still have a net gain 
after he has fully compensated the injured party for the resulting loss.”). 
71. Shavell, supra note 64, at 457 (“Writers on efficient breach have observed that 
breach will tend to be efficient under the expectation measure (since a party contemplating 
breach will commit it if and only if his benefit would exceed the value of performance to the 
other side).”). 
72. Id. at 455 (citing survey evidence that individuals “found the simple, unqualified fact 
of breach to be unethical on average”); Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 408 
(describing the “traditional moral view [that] holds that a contract is a promise, and that 
breaking a promise is immoral” (citing FRIED, supra note 65, at 9–17)); see also Stewart 
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 
63 (1963) (describing contract and contract law as “often thought unnecessary” in 
sophisticated business transactions because of compelling social norms, including that 
“[c]ommitments are to be honored in almost all situations”). 
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incorrect aspect.”73  Shavell demonstrates, though, that observers’ beliefs 
about the morality of a breach can be affected by information regarding 
whether the parties did bargain or would have bargained for specific 
performance upon the occurrence of a particular contingency.74  From 
an attribution standpoint, this makes sense.  One is likely to make 
negative attributions about someone (or herself) who fails to perform a 
promise under certain circumstances that, if discussed, the parties would 
have agreed was to be specifically performed.75  If the parties did not 
contemplate the circumstances, or perhaps if it is unclear whether the 
parties would have required specific performance under such 
circumstances, then one might not ascribe as much control or negativity 
towards the breaching party.76  The knowledge of what the contract 
preparer desired, and the control that the other party has over the 
breach, pushes the other party (as well as the adjudicator) to construct a 
particular attribution of responsibility.77 
Thus, framing a contractual promise in moral terms may serve to 
increase contractual compliance by the other party.78  For example, the 
 
73. Shavell, supra note 66, at 1579. 
74. See Shavell, supra note 64, at 452–55; see also Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 
11, at 406.  Shavell describes how, if the parties had not discussed whether specific 
performance was required (or had agreed that specific performance would not be required) 
under a particular set of circumstances, then observers would believe a breach to be more 
ethically neutral, while if the parties had discussed the specific circumstances and determined 
that performance would be required (or would have so determined if they had discussed it), 
then observers judged the breach to be more unethical.  Shavell, supra note 64, at 455. 
75. See Shavell, supra note 64 at 455 (describing a survey in which the participating 
individuals found a breach to be “ethically neutral” when no duty to perform on the contract 
arose but “quite unethical” when the breach was one of specific performance). 
76. See id. 
77. See Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract 
Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ 
Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 93 (1997) (concluding that the results from the 
study conducted “suggest that consumers’ contract schemas may include a general belief that 
all contract terms are enforceable”); Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 410 
(“Parties’ beliefs about the contract were informed by the terms of the contract itself as well 
as their intuitions or beliefs about contracts in general, namely, that they are enforceable as 
written.”). 
78. Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts: Experimental Evidence of 
Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 88 (2012) 
(conducting an empirical study that suggests “a moral framing of contract performance as 
living up to one’s promise—as compared to a legal threat, an instrumental reminder, or social 
pressure to conform—induced the greatest likelihood of compliance and the greatest relative 
quantity of compliance”).  In Eigen’s study, the “moral prompt” for contract compliance 
reminded participants “that they had made a promise to do something and that they should 
therefore live up to their word and do it.”  Id. 
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contract preparer also may be motivated to prepare the contract in such 
a way as to depict the idea that, in as many circumstances as possible, 
the specific promise made by the other contracting party is sought.79  
This may explain the regular inclusion of provisions requiring specific 
performance in written contracts, even though courts may be reluctant 
to grant specific performance.80  A specific performance clause could 
convince an individual to believe that the expectation from the other 
party is that the promise has to be performed under all circumstances or 
else specific performance will be sought, even if it would make sense for 
the individual to walk away (if permitted) and compensate the non-
breaching party economically.  Second, a specific performance clause 
could convince an individual it is the expectation of the state that the 
promise has to be performed under all circumstances or else specific 
performance will be granted by the state, again regardless of the 
advantage that could be achieved if only monetary damages were 
awarded.  If individuals do not know the frequency with which specific 
performance is awarded (as would be expected), the inclusion of such a 
clause could be impactful.  Similarly, clauses that, in duplicative or 
repetitive fashion, emphasize the promises being made by the other 
party could be impactful.  If people believe that their promises are 
specifically being sought and can be specifically enforced, then they may 
feel different about the immorality of a potential breach.81 
Similarly, recitals in a written contract could also reinforce the 
importance of the promises being given in a particular contract.  Recitals 
are often used in a preliminary section to a contract in order to give a 
brief overview of the contract’s purpose and term.82  These recitals can 
indicate to the other party how “fair” the contract preparer has been or 
emphasize the benefits under the contract, and how the contract 
preparer is seeking particular promises in return from the other contract 
 
79. As an example, one credit card agreement provides, in duplicative fashion, “YOUR 
PROMISE TO US.  You agree to the terms of this Agreement.  You promise to do 
everything this Agreement requires of you. . . .  You specifically promise to pay all amounts 
owed because of transactions made on your Account . . . .”  Credit Card Agreement, CREDIT 
FIRST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (June 1, 2013), https://www.cfna.com/wps/wcm/connect/migr
ation/www.cfna.com/common/credit+application/credit+card+agreement. 
80. Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 271 (1979). 
81. Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 422 (suggesting that “[p]eople’s moral 
intuitions about contract law may make breach less frequent than is economically efficient”). 
82. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1385 (9th ed. 2009) (defining recital as “[a] preliminary 
statement in a contract or deed explaining the reasons for entering into it or the background 
of the transaction, or showing the existence of particular facts”). 
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party.83  For example, an employment agreement’s recitals may indicate 
the employer’s “desire” to compensate an employee assuming that the 
employee fulfills his contractual promises. 
A contract could also emphasize the importance of a particular 
clause and position of the respective parties, specifically that the 
contracting party is “relying” on the promises made by the other 
contracting party and would not have entered into the contract “but for” 
such promises being made.84  As with recitals, if an individual believes 
that the other party was entering into an agreement with a good faith 
belief that the promise would be fulfilled, then the individual may be 
more reluctant to breach the agreement. 
D. Shame, Contract, and Social Norms 
One of the predicates to the shame experience is the predilection of 
individuals to conform to social standards.85  In order to belong to a 
particular community or group, an individual must conform to some 
extent with the standards of that community or group.86  By being able 
to feel shame, an individual can be deterred from deviating from the 
group’s standards, and such conformity can strengthen the bonds of the 
group and an individual’s place within the group.87  Shame can thus 
 
83. Zacks, supra note 9, at 187–88, 201. 
84. See id. at 197, 201, 203 (suggesting that recitals and “reliance” language can be 
utilized to depict a particular story in order to induce the adjudicator to believe that one party 
is more culpable than another with respect to particular contractual outcomes). 
85. Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 230 (“Human beings demonstrate strong 
tendencies to conform to group standards.” (citing Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social 
Pressure, in READINGS ABOUT THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 13 (Elliot Aronson ed., 5th ed. 1988))); 
Scheff, supra note 23, at 402 (describing studies of conformity as illustrating “the way in which 
emotions may lead to social control” (citing Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and 
Conformity: I. A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. 
MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED, no. 9, 1956, at 1)); Tetlock, supra note 44, at 469 
(describing how “people are not only expected to act in accord with prevailing norms, they 
are also expected to censure those who violate norms”). 
86. BAUMEISTER, supra note 20, at 149 (“Culture must find a way to make people want 
to respect those rules and do what is right. . . .  The first stage relies on the need to belong and 
related motives of the concern people have for one another in stable, long-term relationships.  
These are mediated by shame and guilt . . . .”); Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 230; 
Scheff, supra note 23, at 403 (describing conformity studies that demonstrated “subjects will 
find group standards compelling, even though they are exterior and contradictory to their 
own individual standards” (emphasis omitted)). 
87. Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 231 (noting that a group “member who 
anticipates feeling shame upon the violation of group norms will take precautions to avoid 
such behavior.  The capacity for shame experience, then, and its avoidance through 
conformity, can prevent the social rejection or ostracism” arising from not complying with the 
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function as a punishment for not conforming one’s behavior to the 
proper standard.88  It is not, then, merely being placed in the inferior 
position that causes the shame, but also the belief that one is being 
placed in the inferior position and does not want to be associated with 
that position (i.e., suffering that association is the punishment).89 
Presumably, the conformity pressures as to contract compliance 
relate to an individual’s beliefs about the social norms of the group to 
which the individual belongs or wants to belong.90  For individuals, this 
could be an ethnic group, religious group, social group, or even a belief 
about what it means to be an “American.”  Because “these standards 
may change with time and with culture,” contract preparers have a 
vested interest in perpetuating a culture (or the public perceptions of 
the culture) that reinforces their ability to enjoy the benefits of contracts 
made.91  The issue here is that individuals rely on others to communicate 
to them whether shame would be experienced based on particular 
behavior.92  Other people, in other words, indicate to each individual 
whether he or she is worthy of inclusion or exclusion from the group, 
which may include “potent threat signals such as signals of being 
ignored, rejected, disliked, criticized, excluded, and so forth.”93  
Similarly, if the (perceived) social standard within the culture is one of 
 
group norm (citing Scheff, supra note 23, at 397)); Scheff, supra note 23, at 396 (arguing that 
“the degree and type of deference and the attendant emotions of pride and shame make up a 
subtle and pervasive system of social sanctions” that result in conformity). 
88. Robinson et al., supra note 43, at 1653 (“Once the intuitions of justice exist, it is 
disadvantageous to reject publicly the principles of that system or to behave in ways that 
conflict with others’ intuitions.”). 
89. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 18 (“Shame cannot, therefore, consist of inferiority alone 
but, first, must include some notion of a place or position that one does not want to be in or 
an image one does not wish to create and, second, this place or image must be associated with 
negative aversive attributes from which one struggles to escape.”).  Thus, shame (together 
with other self-conscious emotions) may provide “an emotional moral barometer, providing 
immediate and salient feedback on our social and moral acceptability.”  Tangney et al., supra 
note 25, at 22. 
90. See Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 230. 
91. Lewis, supra note 26, at 127; see also Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 166 
(assessing that we should expect more variation in self-conscious emotions across cultures “in 
‘complex’ dimensions like attribution of agency or responsibility, fairness or legitimacy, and 
norm compatibility or morality”). 
92. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 101 (noting that “[s]ocial strategies are 
complex because it is other conspecifics who provide the salient signals about which strategy 
to use and whether a strategy is working or not”). 
93. Id. at 115. 
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contract compliance, then one’s behavior in particular situations can be 
encouraged or discouraged.94 
From a contract standpoint, then, individuals may rely on others to 
inform them whether shame is the appropriate response to different 
contracting behavior.  If others indicate that shame is associated with 
particular acts (a breach) and that group acceptance is predicated on 
refraining from such acts, then individuals may be influenced 
accordingly.95  With respect to contracts, individuals may accept their 
losses, uneconomical promises, and illegal contractual provisions 
because they do not want to feel the shame associated with challenging 
the social norms.96  Similarly, individuals that have breached and are 
being sued (or have been provided notice that they breached) may be 
reluctant to challenge a one-sided or unenforceable contract because 
they feel shame, either actual or anticipatory, associated with being an 
outlier in that situation.  Individuals can make the problem go away by 
submitting (paying the damages or complying with the contract), which 
often may include simply doing nothing (accepting the contract as it is 
without challenge). 
One way in which consumer contracts might reinforce a social norm 
of contract compliance is through the inclusion of an arbitration 
provision in all such contracts (not just a few individuals’ contracts). 
Mandatory arbitration already is criticized because of a “lack of public 
scrutiny,” meaning that the arbitration proceedings are conducted 
privately and usually without a written public record.97  Home lenders, 
for example, could reinforce the social norm of contract compliance 
(and not defaulting on one’s mortgage) by keeping such lending 
practices a secret and addressing disputes concerning those lending 
practices confidentially.98  Thus, by shielding contractual disputes from 
 
94. See Lewis, supra note 26, at 127. 
95. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 115 (“Social signals, therefore, cue affective 
arousal and indicate a need for reparative, defensive, or retaliatory action.”). 
96. Id. at 118 (describing “[s]hame [as] a signal that one is misattuned” to her social 
role).  Shame can influence even those who do not acknowledge the influence of shame.  In 
other words, shame can induce particular conforming behavior in individuals even though 
such individuals do not “experience” shame.  Scheff, supra note 23, at 404 (describing 
“bypassed shame as a causal element in compelling conformity”). 
97. Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1635, 1647. 
98. In 2004, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, large mortgage buyers, announced they 
would no longer purchase mortgages with such clauses, which deterred the use of arbitration 
clauses.  Press Release, Fannie Mae, Announcement 04-06, 4 (Sept. 28, 2004), available at 
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/announcement/04-06.pdf; see also Freddie Mac Promotes 
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public scrutiny, lenders may have benefited from contracts that would 
have been contested had more homeowners known generally about the 
number of similarly situated or similarly acting (defaulting or litigating) 
individuals.99  Such clauses thus obfuscated and distorted what the social 
norm actually was with respect to mortgage default or mortgage 
litigation and permitted lenders to engage in predatory lending practices 
without penalty.100  Many homeowners may have felt anticipatory shame 
upon consideration of strategically defaulting on their mortgage or 
actual shame upon doing so because the confidential nature of mortgage 
litigation precluded them from determining what actual social practice 
was.  If one perceives social practice inaccurately, then one may feel 
anticipatory or actual shame in improper situations and act 
inappropriately.  The preparation of mortgage contracts may provide a 
clear example of such behavior.  With respect to home mortgages, the 
disputes may eventually become public (when a foreclosure judgment is 
enforced and the house is sold), but many contractual disputes would 
not involve such a highly visible enforcement mechanism (e.g., a simple 
monetary judgment).101 
Similar to the historical use of arbitration clauses in home 
mortgages, companies in other industries are using arbitration at an 
increased rate in their contracts, including in contracts where the 
imposition of the clause is not negotiated or appreciated by the other 
contracting party at the time of contract formation.102  Similarly situated 
 
Consumer Choice with New Subprime Mortgage Arbitration Policy, FREDDIE MAC NEWS 
ARCHIVE (Dec. 4, 2003), https://web.archive.org/web/20040220070507/http:/www.freddiemac.
com/news/archives/afford_housing/2003/consumer_120403.html (accessed by searching for 
URL in the Internet Archive) (announcing that “effective August 1, 2004, it would no longer 
invest in subprime mortgages . . . that contain[ed] mandatory arbitration clauses”). 
99. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
100. See Press Release, Fannie Mae, supra note 98; see also Freddie Mac Promotes 
Consumer Choice with New Subprime Mortgage Arbitration Policy, supra note 98. 
101. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 233, 236 (2008) (noting how arbitration is conducted privately and that the awards 
“may or may not contain reasons and may or may not be published or be otherwise generally 
available”). 
102. Id. (noting that “[a]rbitration has become the standard fare in law firms at all levels 
and in most fields”); Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1631 (describing how “U.S. companies are 
increasingly using form contracts, envelope stuffers, and Web sites to require their consumers, 
patients, students, and employees to resolve future disputes through binding arbitration, 
rather than in court”).  Sternlight notes how arbitration “began to be mandated by a broad 
range of industries, including financial institutions (as to personal accounts, house and car 
loans, payday loans, and credit cards), service providers (termite exterminators, gymnasiums, 
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individuals may be unable to ascertain the social practice (breaching, 
challenging, or defending) of others with respect to such contracts and 
whether such social practices are successful.103  Through the silence of 
arbitration (emanating from others’ contractual situations), individuals 
may be left with the likely conclusions that few others breach, challenge, 
or defend such contracts or are able to do so successfully.104  Obviously, 
from a conformity standpoint, if contracting parties cannot perceive the 
actual practices (people are breaching or challenging these contracts) or 
the substantive rights (certain contracts may be rightly challenged) of 
similarly-situated parties, then this lack of transparency potentially 
distorts the market for one-sided or unenforceable contracts.  Either 
through voluntary settlement or arbitration proceedings, contract 
preparers would engage in the practice most likely to keep any 
 
telephone companies, and tax preparers), and sellers of goods (mobile homes, computers, and 
eBay).”  Id. at 1638 (footnotes omitted). 
103. Carbonneau, supra note 101, at 266 (concluding that law “suffers because legal 
norms are no longer elaborated on a public record”).  For example, confidentiality provisions 
routinely contained in settlement agreements concerning civil litigation (concerning torts 
committed by corporate actors) also serve to prevent similarly situated (wronged) individuals 
from becoming aware of their remedies.  Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement Out 
of the Shadows: Information about Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
663, 676 n.51 (2001) (finding that confidentiality provisions are routinely included in 
settlement agreements because “[d]efendants fear that disclosure of settlement information 
will create a sense of entitlement among potential plaintiffs and therefore encourage lawsuits 
by people who otherwise would not feel they had suffered a harm, or would not expect money 
from the defendant for their harm”); Alison Lothes, Comment, Quality, Not Quantity: An 
Analysis of Confidential Settlements and Litigants’ Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
433, 474–75 (2005) (suggesting that confidentiality provisions are routinely included because 
“quantitative publication of settlement amounts encourages frivolous lawsuits, imposing costs 
on the public and defendants and primarily benefiting fraudulent plaintiffs”).  Conversely, 
class actions litigated in public may permit similarly situated individuals to become aware that 
they have been wronged or otherwise have valid claims or defenses.  See Joshua D. Blank & 
Eric A. Zacks, Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach to the Class Action Restriction on 
the Legal Services Corporation, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 10–14 (2005) (discussing generally 
the benefits to the poor of class action litigation). 
104. See Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1674 (noting that arbitration’s “secret proceedings 
inherently threaten a society’s ability to enforce its norms”); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, 
The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 
1, 115 (2004) (“The problem of pluralistic ignorance and the motive for group coherence 
distorts many social norms and would seem to have significant implications for policy and 
law. . . .  It is also behind the pervasive, dysfunctional classroom dynamic in which students do 
not ask questions because they assume that others’ silence suggests they are themselves alone 
in their ignorance, thus contributing to the silence that encourages others to do the same.”).  
In this Article, I am not seeking to describe how norms should be enforced but instead to 
describe how norms can be portrayed falsely to the benefit of one party. 
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challenges or unfavorable decisions confidential from others who might 
be able to utilize such information to realize their own rights. 
The resulting conforming behavior is related to the possibility of 
stigma, which is the “public mark” or distinction suggesting that a 
person is not socially acceptable.105  If the community characterizes 
individuals that breach their contract as “deadbeats,” perhaps others 
will be accordingly deterred from acting in such a way to avoid the 
shame associated with such a label.106  Thus, individuals anticipate the 
“punishment” of shame (arising from possible future conduct) based on 
prior experiences with similar actions or events where shame was 
experienced.107  
Arbitration provisions also may encourage individuals to anticipate 
being stigmatized, particularly where such individuals are unable to 
perceive the actions of similarly situated individuals.  Similarly, in the 
mortgage context, “[t]he stigma against default apparently remains 
robust,” which deters strategic default.108  The deterrent effect of shame 
and contractual features that reinforce a social norm of contract 
compliance may, in fact, explain why few individuals breach contracts 
where the financial advantages of doing so outweigh the financial 
disadvantages.109  Thus, people generally strategically default on their 
mortgages only when their shame is “overwhelmed” by their economic 
 
105. Lewis, supra note 26, at 126.  Lewis notes that “[f]rom the point of view of 
standards, it is quite clear that the stigma that an individual possesses represents a deviation 
from the accepted standards of the society; this deviation may be in appearance, in behavior, 
or in conduct.”  Id. at 127. 
106. See Tetlock, supra note 44, at 458 (“The cognitive research program tells us that 
people use few items of information in making up their minds; the social contingency model 
tells us that subjective estimates of the reactions of those to whom they are accountable will 
be prominent among those few items of information considered.”). 
107. Tangney et al., supra note 25, at 21–22.  Lewis notes that “[s]tigma reflects the idea 
of difference and how difference shames us and those we know” and feeling stigmatized 
arises “through one’s interactions with other people or through one’s anticipation of 
interactions with other people.”  Lewis, supra note 26, at 129, 131. 
108. White, supra note 53, at 1288.  White describes how “homeowners who strategically 
default sometimes report being shunned by others.”  Id.  Similarly, defaulters typically are 
reluctant to share information regarding their defaults to anyone other than close associates 
or neighbors in a similar situation.  Id. at 1290. 
109. See White, supra note 8, at 971–72 (describing “underwater” homeowners who 
continue to make their mortgage payments despite having no prospect of regaining their 
losses). 
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or other circumstances.110  Even though individual homeowners often 
would be better off by “walking away” from their home mortgages, 
individuals are induced in part by a feeling of shame (or anticipatory 
feeling of shame) to continue paying their mortgage or risk being 
labeled a “deadbeat.”111  As long as the contract (in addition to other 
social communication) continues to suggest “personal responsibility” 
and moral promises, then individuals may feel anticipatory shame upon 
contemplating a breach of or contesting the contract.112  This suggests 
that, notwithstanding the contractual ability to breach one’s mortgage, 
contract preparers and others have been able to maintain or at least 
reinforce moral norms about the sanctity of promise.113 
By contrast, if the “stigma” is removed from a particular type of 
behavior, one could expect an increase in that behavior.114  For example, 
homeowners were found to act “strategically” in response to a lender’s 
announcement of a new loan modification program.115  Following the 
lender’s announcement, there was a significant increase in the number 
of defaults by individuals who did not need to default for financial 
distress reasons and who otherwise would not have been expected to 
default.116  One explanation for this behavior could be that the lender 
removed the stigma associated with defaulting on one’s home loan.  By 
acknowledging its willingness to accommodate those stuck in 
 
110. White, supra note 53, at 1289 (describing how homeowners may strategically 
default “not because [they are] shameless but because circumstances overwhelm their shame, 
driving them to make decisions that they would not have made otherwise”). 
111. White, supra note 8, at 971–72, 999 (suggesting that “most underwater homeowners 
choose not to default as a result of two emotional forces: (1) desire to avoid the shame or guilt 
associated with foreclosure; and (2) fear over the perceived consequences of foreclosure”). 
112. Id. at 1007. 
113. This is not to say that the contract preparation is the exclusive mode of reinforcing 
such norms.  Lenders, government actors, and others all have undertaken numerous actions, 
at all stages of the contractual relationship, to communicate and reinforce the notion that one 
should pay one’s mortgage no matter what the circumstances.  Id. at 997 (“[T]he predominant 
message of political, social, and economic institutions in the United States has functioned to 
cultivate fear, shame, and guilt in those who might contemplate foreclosure.”). 
114. See Lewis, supra note 26, at 127 (discussing how stigma “represents a deviation 
from the accepted standards of the society; this deviation may be in appearance, in behavior, 
or in conduct”).  Lewis also suggests that individuals “judge whether or not their behavior 
meets or does not meet these standards.”  Id. 
115. Christopher Mayer et al., Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior: Evidence 
from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide 12, 31 (Columbia Univ. Ctr. for Law & Econ. 
Studies, Working Paper No. 404, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=1836451. 
116. Id. at 31, 34. 
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uneconomical loans (and presumably acknowledging, if implicitly, the 
lender’s blame, in part, for the borrower’s situation), the lender may 
have signaled to borrowers that it was no longer shameful to default 
upon one’s mortgage. 
Consequently, aggressive individuals can be pacified and silenced 
(through settlement, waivers of contractual rights, or the confidentiality 
of arbitration proceedings), and passive individuals can be encouraged 
to defer to the status quo of silence and contractual deference.117  For 
example, with respect to consumer transactions, sellers may renegotiate 
a contract after the fact in order to avoid adverse publicity associated 
with unhappy consumers or a one-sided contract.118  It has been 
suggested that assertive consumers will be rewarded (either by a waiver 
of the contract’s terms or otherwise), while “aggrieved consumers who 
do not display persistence and assertiveness will bear losses.”119  In other 
words, sellers are incentivized to induce passivity on the part of 
consumers with respect to “negative” contract actions.120  Thus, at the 
point of ex post contracting behavior (and the contemplation of a 
breach), the other contracting party likely is faced with a written 
 
117. Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 7, at 207 (describing how, in such instances, 
“all consumers will be offered biased, unfair terms, and only assertive marginal consumers 
will get their way, after negotiating their [standard form contracts]”).  Accordingly, “whereas 
it is basically true that contracting parties do not negotiate [standard form contracts] ex ante, 
actual contracting around the [standard form contract’s] content is more likely to take place 
at the ex post stage.”  Id. at 208.  Interestingly, contract preparers may be unable to induce 
other contract parties not to read their contract and simply defer to the existing relationship.  
At least in the standard form contract context, the legal jargon and visual features (such as 
font size) of a written contract were not important factors in determining whether a consumer 
would read the contract after the fact.  Id. at 225.  That is not to say, however, that the 
presentation and features of the written contract would not affect the actual contracting 
behavior of the parties after they read the contract.  Id. at 226. 
118. Id. at 207 (noting that “sellers fear undermining their own reputations by insisting 
on the language of one-sided contracts”). 
119. Id.  This practice is called “ex post discrimination.”  Id. 
120. Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 422 (“If parties think that a contract is a 
promise to perform, and not simply to confer a benefit as valuable as performance, they may 
be less likely to breach at all.”).  Indeed, only certain types of individuals may be inclined to 
challenge a contract.  Becher and Unger-Aviram note the argument that “people, and 
especially women, fear the negotiation procedure” associated with challenging an existing 
contract.  Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 7, at 225 n.59.  If so, then such individuals may 
forego reading the contract and attempting to renegotiate, even if such activities would be 
beneficial.  Id.; see also id. at 206 (describing the two main reasons that consumers may read 
contracts after formation as to develop familiarity with rights and obligations generally (so as 
to be able conform conduct accordingly), as well as to develop a strategy to modify the 
contract after it has been executed). 
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contract that contains unfavorable substantive terms in the event of a 
breach, and such terms are likely presented in a manner designed to 
deter breach. 
From the contract preparer’s standpoint, then, the actual results in 
arbitration may be less important than the social messaging and 
deterrence that occurs from the silence of all such proceedings.121  One’s 
inability to perceive that contracts are being challenged and could and 
should be challenged suggests that contract preparers can overreach.  
Contract preparers are also then permitted to deal with similarly 
situated individuals differently in order to maintain this silence. 
III. COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS AND CONTRACT DESIGN 
In addition to triggering particular negative emotions such as shame, 
contract preparers may prepare contracts designed to exploit particular 
cognitive biases and judgment heuristics of the other contract party with 
respect to post-formation behavior.  After identifying particular biases 
and heuristics, this Part will examine particular contract provisions that 
may anticipate and manipulate such biases and heuristics. 
Individual contracting parties’ contracting behavior at the time of 
contract formation often does not fit within the standard rational-actor 
model, which may be attributed to the “limits of cognition,” including 
“limits based on bounded rationality and rational ignorance, limits 
based on disposition, and limits based on defective capability.”122  
Previous critiques of the rational-actor model with respect to individual 
contracting behavior generally focus on the period during which the 
contract is executed or negotiated.123  This Article examines these same 
cognitive limitations in the context of individual contracting behavior 
after the contract has been executed, particularly with respect to 
decisions concerning whether to breach or challenge a contract.  
 
121. See Sternlight, supra note 16, at 1672 (concluding that “[p]rivate proceedings and 
private awards offer no opportunity for nondisputants to learn from what happened”). 
122. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 211, 213 (1995); see also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (describing limits on individual cognitive 
abilities and the coping mechanisms individuals use that may cause behavior to “differ[] in 
systematic ways from that predicted by the standard economic model of unbounded 
rationality”). 
123. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1107–08 (discussing homeowner contracting 
behavior at the time of home mortgage contract execution); Robert Prentice, Contract-Based 
Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 374 
(discussing investor contracting behavior at the time of investment contract execution). 
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Moreover, if such behavior suggests that individuals are not acting 
completely rationally at such times, then one should expect contract 
preparers to anticipate such irrational behavior and coordinate their 
contracts to encourage particular decisions. 
A. Information Gathering Strategies 
Individuals often do not act completely rational due to the 
unavailability of information or incomplete information processing.124  
This is because individuals are concerned with finding merely 
“satisfactory” rather than “optimal” decisions.125  Accordingly, 
individuals may engage in limited information searches (perhaps based 
on the relative perceived costs and benefits of such a search) or utilize 
limited decision-making processes (perhaps relying on “rule-of-thumb 
heuristics”).126  For example, the amount of information gathering 
required in order to evaluate or negotiate a liquidated damages 
provision and navigate the “complexity of determining the application 
of a liquidated damages provision to every possible breach scenario is 
often likely to exceed actors’ calculating capabilities.”127 
With respect to the decision to breach a contract after the contract 
has been executed, one may similarly expect individuals to do a limited 
or no search with respect to similarly situated individuals (e.g., “What 
have others done in my situation?” or “Have others ‘gotten away’ with a 
breach?”).  This may result in a perception that few other individuals in 
a similar situation have chosen to breach or have “gotten away” with a 
breach, thus indicating that the appropriate course of action is to comply 
with the contract. 
 
124. Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 214 (“Accordingly, human rationality is normally 
bounded by limited information and limited information processing.”); see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Moral Heuristics 2–3 (U. Chi. John M. Olin L. & Econ. Working Paper Series, No. 
180, 2003), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/180.crs_.moral_.pdf (arguing 
“that moral heuristics play a pervasive role in moral, political, and legal judgments, and that 
they produce serious mistakes. . . .  And if good heuristics misfire in the factual domain, they 
will inevitably do so in the domains of morality and law as well”). 
125. Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 214. 
126. Id. at 215 (describing “rule-of-thumb heuristics (decision rules)” such as following 
or imitating a neighbor’s practice); Chris Guthrie, Principles of Influence in Negotiation, 87 
MARQ. L. REV. 829, 830 (2004) (discussing “Cialdini’s principles of influence [as operating] 
like these heuristics and biases (though they are ‘motivational’ rather than ‘cognitive’ in 
origin).  When deciding whether to comply with a request, individuals generally look for 
simple cues . . . .” (citing ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE (4th 
ed. 2001))). 
127. Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 227. 
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This Article suggests that contract preparers anticipate such 
“bounded rationality” with respect to ex post decision-making and 
prepare contracts to exploit individual limits on information gathering 
and processing.128  Thus, the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings 
(compelled by the arbitration provision in the contract) may result in 
less information about similarly situated individuals being available 
when a contracting party is determining whether to breach or challenge 
a contract.129  By obfuscating the existence of contract disputes, contract 
preparers may encourage incorrect perceptions by the other contract 
party that her “neighbors” do not breach or challenge contracts, even if 
in fact they do (but are “hidden” from view because of arbitration’s 
confidentiality).130  Thus, if an unenforceable contract provision is 
included in a contract but is never challenged in public, an individual 
contracting party is unable (even if desired) to engage in “optimal” 
substantive decision-making, and given the proclivity for merely 
“satisfactory” substantive decision-making, the contracting party may 
incorrectly determine that the “satisfactory” decision is not to challenge 
the provision in question.131  For example, people often believe that “the 
parties [are] morally bound by the specific language of the contract, 
even when contract law says that the exculpatory clause is 
unenforceable or that the promisor can pay rather than perform.”132  
This belief may be influenced by the lack of knowledge regarding 
whether such provisions can be or are challenged.133  Thus, contract 
preparers may purposefully conceal or fail to disclose information to 
 
128. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 3, at 635, 691 (arguing that “the presence of unyielding 
cognitive biases makes individual decisionmakers susceptible to manipulation by those able to 
influence the context in which decisions are made. . . .  [W]e believe that market outcomes 
frequently will be heavily influenced, if not determined, by the ability of one actor to control 
the format of information, the presentation of choices, and, in general, the setting within 
which market transactions occur”). 
129. See Zacks, supra note 15, at 1497. 
130. See id. at 1497–98. 
131. Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 214 (describing the difference between “optimal 
substantive decisions” and “satisfactory substantive decisions” (emphasis omitted)). 
132. Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 423. 
133. See id. at 422 (“[I]ndividuals who are not familiar with the rule of expectation 
damages . . . .  believe that they are legally (and morally) obligated to perform.  Researchers 
have found that people believe that exculpatory clauses in contracts mean that they cannot 
seek compensation.” (citing Stolle & Slain, supra note 77, at 91)). 
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exploit an individual’s already limited information gathering and 
processing.134 
B. Framing 
Individuals also utilize judgment heuristics that deviate from a 
model of rationality and “yield systematic errors.”135  For example, 
individuals’ choices may also be influenced by the framing of the 
outcomes arising from each choice.136  If an option is framed in terms of 
possible gains, individuals prefer the “sure gain” of a lower value to the 
“chance” with a higher value, while if an option is framed in terms of 
possible losses, individuals prefer the “chance of loss” with a higher 
value rather than the “sure loss” of a lower value.137  In other words, 
“most people are risk-averse when contemplating gains, but risk-
preferring when contemplating losses.”138  Individuals also suffer more 
regret from a loss suffered than the happiness (or utility) enjoyed from 
an equivalent benefit.139  Consequently, the “anticipation of regret over 
actions that yield disappointing results is usually stronger than the 
anticipation of rejoicing over actions that yield desirable results.”140 
Such judgment heuristics (utilized by non-drafting parties) may 
explain why many “fee-shifting” provisions are drafted as they are.  Fee-
shifting provisions typically provide that in the event of a dispute 
regarding the contract, the losing party will be obligated to pay the 
winning party’s costs and fees associated with litigating the dispute.141  A 
contract preparer, in order to frame the contract in the most 
 
134. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 3, at 635 (“Once one accepts that individuals 
systematically behave in nonrational ways, it follows from an economic perspective that 
others will exploit those tendencies for gain.”). 
135. Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 218. 
136. Id. at 218–19 (describing the failure of “invariance,” which suggested that “a 
decisionmaker’s preference between two options should not depend on how a choice is 
characterized and presented”). 
137. Id. at 219. 
138. Id. 
139. Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological 
Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1620 (1998) (“Loss 
aversion theory posits that the utility consequences to individuals of suffering a ‘loss’ from a 
reference point will be greater than an equivalent ‘gain’ from the same reference point.  If 
losses loom larger than gains, it follows logically that anticipated regret would loom larger 
than anticipated rejoicing.” (footnote omitted)). 
140. Id. at 1619. 
141. Nicholas N. Nierengarten, Fee-Shifting: The Recovery of In-House Legal Fees, 39 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 227, 227–28 (2012). 
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advantageous manner, could include a provision that does not indicate 
the “possibility” of the other party winning but instead include a 
declarative statement to the effect that: “If you breach this contract, you 
will be responsible for all of the costs and fees we incur in connection 
with enforcing this contract.” 
By framing the possibility of paying for the other party’s costs and 
fees as a guaranteed loss rather than a chance of loss, contract preparers 
may be able to deter more breaches.142  If the fees were portrayed as 
being conditional, then perhaps a party would choose the “riskier” 
option of a breach that possibly would result in damages (the lost 
amount due under the contract), plus possible fees and costs.  
Additionally, an arbitration provision that maintains the confidentiality 
of the actual results of any similar disputes and the frequency of such 
disputes may distort the perception of whether such fees will be and are 
collected. 
If, on the other hand, the provision provided that: “If there is a 
contract dispute, the losing party will be required to pay the winning 
party’s costs and fees incurred in connection with the dispute,” then the 
other contracting party may consider the possible payment of the other 
party’s fees and costs as a contingency.  The provision does not include 
or describe a guarantee that such fees and costs would be paid, but 
instead provides for such payment only if the other contract party was 
the losing party in litigation.  If, when deciding whether to breach a 
contract, one will be deciding between a sure loss (complying with the 
contract) and a possible future loss (possibly being forced to pay for 
breaching the contract, including the other party’s costs and fees), then 
the contracting party may choose to breach (as risk-preferring when 
dealing with potential losses).143  If the latter is characterized in the 
contract not as a possibility but instead as a certainty, then the fee-
shifting (and indemnity) provisions may deter an individual from 
 
142. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 3, at 685 (“Whether something is coded as a loss, thus 
raising the possibility of loss aversion, depends on how it is framed.  In this respect, one may 
usefully conceive of framing effects as a mechanism for eliciting other cognitive biases—in 
other words, a mechanism for manipulating individual perceptions and decisions.”). 
143. See Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 219. 
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breaching.144  The framing of the contract, then, may have implications 
beyond representing the bargain at the time of formation.145 
Contracts framed in terms of a loss (as opposed to a gain) can also 
lead to increased efforts on the part of the other party.146  For example, 
an employment contract that characterizes compensation as a wage plus 
a contingent bonus (if certain thresholds are met) may induce less effort 
than an employment contract that describes compensation as a wage less 
a deduction (if certain thresholds are not met), even though the 
compensation is the same under each contract.147  It may be, then, “the 
loss frame communicates a stronger sense of the default expectation of 
the party offering the contract.”148  Thus, framing contingent amounts as 
a loss appears to “threaten a ‘punishment,’” suggesting to the individual 
that “expectations to meet the threshold are higher under the loss frame 
than under the gain frame.”149 
This may explain why contract preparers may include late fees or 
termination fees rather than bonuses (presumably as a reduction to the 
required payment or credited towards the next payment) for paying on 
time or not terminating before a certain date.  In each case, the total 
amount to be paid under a contract is the same, but contract preparers 
can expect “better” performance from the other party if all “extra” 
amounts under the contract are characterized as penalties or losses.150  
The expectation, then, under the loss-framing contract, is paying “less” 
(and avoiding the late fees).151  This is a different scenario, of course, 
 
144. See id. 
145. Id. at 220 (describing how “failure of invariance is both pervasive and robust” 
(quoting Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 341, 343 (1984))). 
146. Richard R. W. Brooks et al., Framing Contracts: Why Loss Framing Increases 
Effort, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 62, 63 (2012). 
147. Id.  The fixed wage under the second contract would be higher by the amount of 
the possible deduction and the deduction would be equal to the possible bonus under the first 
contract. 
148. Id. at 74.  Brooks et al. conclude that the loss frame sets an expectation “that 
cognitively induces subjects to invest more effort.”  Id. at 81. 
149. Id. at 65.  Brooks et al. suggest that this makes sense given that “a reward is often 
viewed as a kind of recognition for voluntary overperformance, while a punishment is more 
akin to a sanction for not meeting the client’s expectation.”  Id. 
150. See id. at 81 (citing evidence suggesting that “framing contracts in a manner that 
makes ‘losses’ more salient than ‘gains’ leads to greater effort” (citing Tanjim Hossain & John 
A. List, The Behavioralist Visits the Factory: Increasing Productivity Using Simple Framing 
Manipulations, 58 MGMT. SCI. 2151 (2012))). 
151. See id. 
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than a contract in which a concrete “bonus” is possible, but one would 
expect the same effect to be present.152  Contract preparers invite the 
conclusion that performance is expected, that timely performance is 
expected, and that failure to meet these expectations will be sanctioned.  
Characterized as such in the contracts, one would expect higher 
compliance rates than if the contracts required higher payments but 
promised a “reward” or “bonus” for performing as and when required 
under the contract. 
C. Regret Theory 
Individuals’ behavior often is influenced by the desire to avoid 
regret, which can lead to an individual maintaining current behavior or 
avoiding any act that could lead to regret.153  Individuals typically feel 
more regret from a loss arising from engaging in a new activity than 
from a loss arising from being passive.154  Contracting parties accordingly 
may rather suffer a loss from complying with an unfavorable contract 
than suffer an equivalent loss by challenging or breaching the contract.  
Thus, individuals may be inclined to continue performing under 
unfavorable contracts for fear of the consequences, however unlikely, 
that may arise if the individual breached or challenged the contract.  
This tendency also can be exploited by contract preparer, who can 
emphasize the losses and costs (e.g., late fees, litigation costs, and 
 
152. Id. at 65–66 (describing the possible endowment effect associated with the 
description of a contingent “bonus”). 
153. Tetlock, supra note 44, at 472 (describing how “people tend to avoid decisions in 
which they could appear after the fact to have made the wrong choice, even if in advance the 
decision appeared correct given the information available at the time”); see also Zacks, supra 
note 9, at 176 (“The status quo bias describes the tendency of individuals to prefer the status 
quo (the contract as presented) even if the status quo does not efficiently allocate 
rights . . . .”). 
154. Tetlock, supra note 44, at 472 (“[P]eople feel greater regret for bad outcomes that 
are the result of new actions than for similar outcomes resulting from inaction.”); Korobkin, 
supra note 139, at 1613 (“Substantial experimental evidence suggests that individuals predict 
that greater regret will follow an action that leads to an undesirable result than a failure to act 
that leads to the same undesirable result.”); see also Chris Guthrie, Better Settle than Sorry: 
The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 72 (positing 
“that litigants seek to make litigation decisions that minimize the likelihood they will 
experience postlitigation regret”); Zacks, supra note 15, at 1476 (arguing that “[t]he tendency 
to experience more regret from negative situations resulting from actions an individual takes 
rather than inaction also may explain [credit card holders’] reluctance to negotiate credit card 
agreements”); Zeelenberg, supra note 29, at 329 (explaining how “we may avoid deciding as a 
consequence of anticipated regret. . . .  simply in order to avoid making the wrong decision”). 
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foreclosure) associated with not choosing the “default” of complying 
with the contract.155 
If people are reluctant to breach or challenge a contract because of a 
preference for ending up in an equally bad situation from inaction 
(complying with the contract) rather than action (breaching or 
challenging the contract), then contract preparers should be incentivized 
to exploit this tendency.156  For example, under many home mortgage 
contracts, a defaulting homeowner will be responsible for any deficiency 
between the amount for which the home sells in foreclosure and the 
loan amount, plus fees and costs.157  Most lenders, however, do not seek 
to recover such deficiency amounts, presumably because of the cost or 
unlikelihood (due to the debtor’s inability to pay) of collection.158  The 
contractual right to collect this deficiency nevertheless may serve as a 
deterrent to those contemplating a breach because people anticipate the 
regret that would be experienced if such deficiency were enforced.159 
In other words, the prospect of suffering the losses arising from a 
breach (the deficiency judgment, plus costs and fees) may deter 
someone from breaching, even if the likelihood of such losses being 
 
155. Korobkin, supra note 139, at 1616 (“The link between norm theory and the 
tendency of individuals to favor choices correlated with inaction over action is the prediction 
that actions are more mutable [more abnormal or exceptional] than failures [to] act” and thus 
more “likely to be perceived as the cause of the negative event.”).  Korobkin also describes 
how people associate additional personal control with action as compared with inaction, and 
“[t]he thought that something bad happened when something good could have happened 
instead is likely to be more distressing when the actor also thinks he could have done 
something to avoid the negative outcome.”  Id. at 1617.  This may also explain the high costs 
of arbitration, which can act as an additional deterrent to defying the contract.  See, e.g., 
Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 371 (N.C. 2008) (discussing the 
costs associated with arbitration that are not incurred in regular litigation proceedings). 
156. See Korobkin, supra note 139, at 1617. 
157. Jay Adkisson, Foreclosure, Deficiency Judgments and the Perils of Anti-Deficiency 
Statutes, FORBES.COM (June 24, 2012, 12:49 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/20
12/06/24/foreclosure-deficiency-judgments-and-the-perils-of-anti-deficient-statutes/; see also 
Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1105 (noting that foreclosure fees and dispute resolution fees can be 
significant). 
158. Luigi Guiso et al., Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic Default on Mortgages 3 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 15145, 2009), available at http://www.nber.or
g/papers/w15145 (noting that “the cost of legal procedures is sufficiently high that most 
lenders are unwilling to sue a defaulted borrower unless he has significant wealth besides the 
home”); Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1135–37 (noting the tremendous losses arising for lenders 
in the event of a foreclosure). 
159. Tetlock, supra note 44, at 470–71 (“Accountable decision-makers are more likely to 
anticipate how difficult it would be to justify choosing an option that led to a worst-case 
outcome.  One would stand accused of recklessness.”). 
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realized is small.160  The severity of a contractual outcome arising from 
breach, rather than its probability, may prove vital to a contract 
preparer’s ability to maintain contract compliance.161  The prospect of a 
severely negative outcome may consequently impact the experience of a 
contracting party’s anticipatory regret and influence her contracting 
behavior.162 
D. Social Proof 
Individuals tend to rely on social proof when encountering a new or 
uncertain situation and when there are perceived similarities between 
themselves and others who have encountered the same situation.163  
Most individuals presumably do not (consciously) breach many of their 
contracts, and material contract breaches are perhaps even more rare 
(such as deciding whether to default on a home mortgage), so individual 
contracting parties may be expected to rely on social proof when faced 
with such a novel situation. 
Similarly, many individuals would likely perceive similarities 
between themselves and other individual contracting parties with 
respect to most consumer transactions.  If one’s neighbors do not default 
on a home mortgage, this may be fairly convincing.  In order to take 
advantage of social proof, the contract preparer must reinforce the 
social norms regarding compliance with a contract’s terms as written 
(and not contesting an unfavorable contract).164  Social conformity can 
be reinforced through the silence of litigation disputes (through the 
confidentiality of arbitration) or negotiations and confidential 
settlements with the few individuals who do challenge a contract.165  If 
these social norms are not perceived by the other contracting party, or 
 
160. But see Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1127 (suggesting that lenders should want to hide 
fees in order to induce an “imperfectly rational borrower . . . to underestimate the total cost 
of the loan”). 
161. See Prentice, supra note 123, at 362–63; see also, e.g., White, supra note 8, at 972. 
162. See, e.g., White, supra note 8, at 972. 
163. Guthrie, supra note 126, at 831–32; see also supra text accompanying note 17. 
164. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 116 (rev. 
ed. 2007) (describing how our perception of the behavior of others in a particular situation 
influences our belief about what the proper behavior is); HERBERT W. SIMONS & JEAN G. 
JONES, PERSUASION IN SOCIETY 215 (2d ed. 2011) (defining as plurastic ignorance “[t]he 
assumption that individuals make that ‘because nobody is concerned, nothing is wrong’”); 
Scheff, supra note 23, at 396 (describing how “[o]ur thoughts and perceptions of social 
expectations only set the stage for social control”).  For more information, see supra Parts 
II.B and C for a discussion of social standards and their relationship to inducing shame. 
165. See supra Part II.D. 
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are weakened through other individuals who do not abide by them, then 
the contract preparer risks additional losses on his contracts through 
strategic defaults and other litigation disputes. 
Empirical evidence with respect to strategic defaults of home 
mortgages supports the above description.  For example, “homeowners 
who are personally acquainted with someone who has strategically 
defaulted are much more likely to default than those who are not.”166  
This suggests that lenders should be motivated to keep the occurrence 
of strategic default and related foreclosure proceedings as confidential 
as possible.  Similarly, homeowners that did not share the moral belief 
that default is immoral were more likely to default strategically.167  As 
discussed above, until 2004, most lenders included arbitration provisions 
in their subprime mortgages, which could have had the muting effect 
with respect to the occurrence of breach.168  Of course, the 
confidentiality of arbitration does not preclude the communication of 
strategic default by one individual to another, but it could dampen the 
general public’s awareness of such acts.  In fact, most Americans believe 
that defaulting on one’s mortgage is immoral.169 
It may be easier to keep the incidence of breaches and strategic 
defaults (or other contractual challenges) “quiet” with respect to 
contracts that do not include property as significant and visible as a 
house.  With respect to breaching one’s home mortgage, eventually the 
breach will come to light once the house is sold after foreclosure 
proceedings commence.  With respect to other contracts, it may be 
impossible for others to detect that one breached her contract and was 
forced to pay (or not forced to pay) damages as a result. 
 
166. White, supra note 53, at 1285; Luigi Zingales, The Menace of Strategic Default, 20 
CITY J. 47, 50 (2010) (“Perceived social norms also seem to affect the propensity to walk 
away [from one’s mortgage]: knowing somebody who defaulted strategically, or living in an 
area where many people have done so, makes a person much more likely to declare his 
willingness to follow suit.”); Guiso et al., supra note 158, at 21 (“The most important barriers 
to strategic default seem to be moral and social.”). 
167. White, supra note 53, at 1285. 
168. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
169. White, supra note 53, at 1287–88 (noting a 2009 study that “eighty-one percent of 
Americans believed that it was morally wrong to default on one’s mortgage” (citing Guiso et 
al., supra note 158, at 10, 21)).  White cites a similar study finding that “eighty-five percent of 
Americans believed it was morally wrong even if one faced financial difficulties . . . that made 
it difficult to pay one’s mortgage.”  Id. at 1288 (citing News Release, Fannie Mae, New 
Nationwide Survey Provides Comprehensive Look at Sentiment Toward Housing (Apr. 6, 
2010), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/portal/about-us/media/corporate-news/2010/498 
9.html). 
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E. Authority 
Contract preparers can also utilize the influence of authority or the 
appearance of authority to induce the other contract parties to comply 
with the contract.170  Contracts can appear authoritative through their 
official and legal appearance.171  For example, the mere inclusion of 
exculpatory clauses, even if unenforceable, “may deter consumers from 
pursuing their rights and seeking compensation.”172  Similarly, the 
contract preparer may perhaps appear as an authority or powerful figure 
in the contract through the use of a defined term (“Bank,” “Employer,” 
or “Company”), while the other party is diminished similarly through a 
particular label (“Borrower,” “Employee,” the party’s last name, or 
“Customer”).173  The labels inform as to the relative authority of the two 
parties: the “Bank” is more of an authority than the “Borrower.”174  The 
“Borrower” may not, then, be inclined to challenge the “Bank’s” 
authority to charge particular fees or to consider breaching the contract.  
Similarly, the use of all capital letters or boldface type with respect to 
particular contractual disclaimers or waivers may induce the other 
contracting party to believe that she is in a subordinate position and is, 
to some extent, being yelled at or scolded.175 
Cognitive biases, reinforced by anticipatory regret, lead individuals 
“to imbue the form contract that they are presented by form givers with 
a presumption of legitimacy and fairness that they are hesitant to 
challenge.”176  This Article extends this argument to post-formation 
 
170. SIMONS & JONES, supra note 164, at 138–40 (describing examples in which apparent 
authority figures were able to induce deference or particular behavior). 
171. Prentice, supra note 123, at 372. 
172. Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra 7, at 207.  Becher and Unger-Aviram rely on the 
study performed by Stolle and Slain, where “the presence of exculpatory language in form 
contracts does appear to have some deterrent effect on consumers’ propensity to seek 
compensation.”  Stolle & Slain, supra note 77, at 92; Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra 7, at 207 
& n.27. 
173. See Prentice, supra note 123, at 372 (asserting that contracting parties will be 
unlikely to question the terms of a form contract because a “dense form contract has an 
‘authoritative legality’ about it that induces deference”). 
174. See id. 
175. See Laura Schocker, Why Do Capital Letters So Annoy Us?, BBC NEWS MAG., 
Sept. 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8234637.stm (explaining that language written in 
capital letters is commonly thought to connote screaming or yelling). 
176. See Prentice, supra note 123, at 374.  Prentice suggests, “[T]o the extent that a 
preprinted form contract appears to represent the normal condition (the contract that 
everyone else is signing), people will anticipate that they would suffer greater regret from 
adverse consequences stemming from an abnormal situation (forcing a rewriting of the 
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contract behavior: to the extent that compliance with the contract (as 
indicated by the contract, the behavior of others, social norms, and 
otherwise) appears to represent the normal condition, people will 
anticipate that they would suffer greater regret from adverse 
consequences stemming from an abnormal situation (breaching or 
challenging the contract) than those arising from a normal situation 
(simply complying with the contract as written). 
F. Attribution Theory 
The above descriptions of human decision-making processes, biases, 
and heuristics neatly tie with the idea of attribution-based theories, 
which posit that individuals determine blame for a particular outcome or 
behavior based on whether the perceived cause of the outcome or 
behavior was external or internal.177  If a person believes that she caused 
a particular outcome (or that it is something about her or related to her 
that caused the event), then she will feel a higher degree of shame.178  
One’s perception of causation is based on the outcome controllability.179 
If one believes that she could control whether a particular outcome 
occurred or not, then she will believe that she is responsible for the 
outcome (and feel shame under certain social circumstances).180  
Perceptions about responsibility thus trigger conclusions, both 
 
contract) than those arising from a normal situation (simply accepting the form presented).”  
Id. at 377. 
177. Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 21, 21–22 (1995) (noting that attribution theories are all “grounded in a common 
metaphor that construes the human skin as a special boundary that separates one set of 
‘causal forces’ from another”); see also MARK R. LEARY, THE CURSE OF THE SELF: SELF-
AWARENESS, EGOTISM, AND THE QUALITY OF HUMAN LIFE 96 (2004) (describing how 
“[f]ollowing a failure, trauma, or other undesirable event, people may engage in behavioral 
self-blame, in which they attribute the event to a behavioral mistake or miscalculation on their 
part, they may engage in characterological self-blame in which they attribute the event to 
some relatively unchangeable aspect of themselves, or they may blame external factors such 
as other people or society at large”); Tracy & Robins, supra note 22, at 12 (describing how 
“self-conscious emotions occur when individuals attribute the eliciting event to internal 
causes”). 
178. Lewis, supra note 26, at 127; Tracy & Robins, supra note 22, at 12 (differentiating 
between “the narrow sense of attribution theory (e.g., ‘Did I cause the event?’)” with the 
“more general sense of ‘Is something about me or related to me the cause of the event?’”). 
179. Lewis, supra note 26, at 128. 
180. See id. at 127 (describing how people blame themselves or are blamed by others for 
various health conditions based on perceptions about whether the condition could have been 
avoided); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 3, at 736 (describing that consumer responses to 
product malfunctions depend on whether the manufacturer or consumer is the perceived 
cause of the failure and whether such cause was perceived to be controllable). 
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individual and social, about whether one should be shamed or 
stigmatized for a particular condition or outcome.181  These perceptions, 
in turn, can be affected by “cultural variation in causal attribution.”182 
The goal of the contract preparer, then, is to convince the non-
drafting party that she is the cause of the “problem” herself rather than 
the contract preparer and to reinforce a cultural norm of individual 
responsibility for one’s actions.183  Contract preparers accordingly are 
incentivized to prepare the contracts to convey, to the other contracting 
party and adjudicators (as well as the community at large), the 
voluntariness, objectivity, and fairness of the consent given by the other 
contracting party to the contract.184  If an individual either perceives that 
others will feel a particular way about her or actually believes that she 
herself is to blame for being in a particular contracting situation, then 
she will be deterred from acting in a manner likely to lead to an 
experience of shame.185 
For example, the inclusion of multiple signature blocks or 
disclaimers in all capital letters may suggest to the contracting party that 
the adjudicative party will be more likely to blame and shame her if she 
breaches than the contract preparer.186  Such features also could 
convince the other party to feel “silly” for not knowing what terms are 
 
181. Lewis, supra note 26, at 127 (concluding that “[t]he degree to which stigmatized 
persons can blame themselves or are blamed by others for their condition reflects their 
degree of shame”); Tracy & Robins, supra note 22, at 12 (noting that “studies have shown 
that internal attributions for failure tend to produce guilt and shame”). 
182. Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 166. 
183. Id. (noting how “[j]udgments of agency and responsibility are central to moral 
judgment, as well as the occurrence of self-conscious emotions” (internal citation omitted)).  
Goetz and Keltner describe how “[j]udgments of agency and responsibility also vary 
dramatically across different cultures,” again reinforcing the premise that contract preparers 
have a vested interest in how the agency and responsibility of the other contracting parties are 
perceived by both the other contracting parties and other contracting parties themselves.  Id.; 
see also Zacks, supra note 9, at 199 (discussing the incentives for contract preparers to depict 
within the contract the voluntariness and other indicators of agency and responsibility so that 
adjudicators will blame or otherwise feel negatively towards the other contracting party). 
184. Lewis, supra note 26, at 128 (noting how “social rules involve not only standards 
and rules but also societal beliefs about controllability”).  Lewis importantly notes how 
“[r]esponsibility can change as a function of new knowledge and information or a change in 
social values.”  Id.  Accordingly, this Article argues that contract preparers have a vested 
interest in maintaining the status quo with respect to contracting culture. 
185. Id. at 127 (concluding that “[f]or a person to fear stigma from such a [public] 
violation, it must be transparent, such as in physical appearance or action”). 
186. See Zacks, supra note 9, at 171, 210 (arguing that multiple signature blocks and 
boldface language can induce adjudicators to make conclusions about which party to blame 
for a particular contractual outcome); Schocker, supra note 175. 
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contained in written contract, thus evoking feelings of shame.187  The use 
of capital letters themselves may indicate that the terms should have 
been more clear to the other contract party and also warn the other 
contract party from acting in an undesirable manner.188  Individuals do 
not want to be an outlier in a social situation, so they usually conform to 
the social norms, or risk shame if they do not.189 
In addition, blaming one’s self (which can also trigger feelings of 
shame) could be understood as a self-preservation technique to avoid 
feeling vulnerable in a situation over which an individual exercised very 
little control.190  This allows individuals to operate within a risky world 
and believe that they are not continuously vulnerable to such 
situations.191  People may then have a subconscious desire to be blamed 
for their contractual outcomes (particularly those in which they 
 
187. Tamara J. Ferguson et al., Shame and Guilt as Morally Warranted Experiences, in 
THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 330, 341 
(“Overestimates of an outcome’s controllability might support intense feelings of guilt (for 
producing avoidable harm) and shame (for being the type of person who produces avoidable 
harm).”); see also Tetlock, supra note 44, at 468 (“One way of pressuring other people to 
behave is by indicating to them that one has a low tolerance for justifications or excuses and 
that one will treat their behavior as automatically diagnostic of underlying intentions.”).  It 
also has been demonstrated that the more time an individual spends reading a contract (ex 
ante), the more likely the individual is to comply with the terms of the contract.  Zev J. Eigen, 
Experimental Evidence of the Relationship Between Reading the Fine Print and Performance 
of Form-Contract Terms, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 124, 139 (2012) 
(“[T]his research presents evidence that suggests that the more time individuals spend 
reading contracts into which they are entering, the more likely they are to perform as 
contractually obligated.”).  Thus, contract preparers may include multiple signature blocks to 
induce the other party to read (not just to induce counterfactual analysis), which also could 
lead to a higher compliance rate. 
188. Schocker, supra note 175 (noting that one’s use of all capital letters in electronic 
mail correspondence is commonly understood to connote screaming, while traditionally the 
use of all capital letters was reserved to express formality as well as emphasis).  It is possible 
that contracting parties are consequently affected by the use of all capital letters when 
examining such warnings or disclaimers when deciding upon a particular course of contracting 
behavior. 
189. Tetlock, supra note 44, at 455 (describing “[a]ccountability [as the] critical rule and 
norm enforcement mechanism—the social psychological link between individual decision-
makers and the social systems to which they belong”). 
190. Prentice, supra note 123, at 406 (“[The] desire to make themselves feel comfortable 
in their environment, coupled with the illusion of control . . ., the desire to feel free from 
potential victimhood, and to believe that they live in a just world . . . make it easy for jurors 
and others to tend to blame investors . . . .  These factors are so strong that not only do others 
tend to blame victims, victims tend to blame themselves for things that clearly are not their 
fault.”). 
191. See Bernice Andrews, Shame and Childhood Abuse, in SHAME: INTERPERSONAL 
BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21, at 176, 178. 
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exercised very little power with respect to the negotiation of the 
contract).  By blaming themselves, people may feel comforted by the 
illusion that they can avoid the situation in the future if they acted 
differently, even though in all reality they likely will or would not. 
Contract preparers should again then reinforce the voluntariness of 
the contract’s negotiations and execution in order to present a scenario 
where the other contracting party is compelled towards self-blame or is 
comforted by such a depiction.192  These features can encourage 
particular counterfactual analysis, meaning that the individual will 
attempt to determine what changes in the facts or variables involved in 
an outcome would have resulted in a different outcome.193  Contractual 
provisions that indicate that the contracting party had multiple 
opportunities to walk away, such as by the inclusion of multiple 
signature blocks or a boldfaced caption before the signature page 
indicating that the contracting party had consulted counsel prior to 
executing the contract, could lead one to blame one’s self were one to 
consider breaching or challenging the contract.194 
The negative emotions discussed earlier in this Article are also 
associated with, and may even trigger, such counterfactual analysis on 
the part of the individual.195  Again, in the contract context, contracts 
may trigger particular emotional responses (e.g., shame) that may be 
associated with particular counterfactual thinking (e.g., “If only I did not 
sign the contract, I would not be in this mess”).  Or, contracts may 
 
192. Zacks, supra note 9, at 210. 
193. Robert N. Strassfeld, If . . . : Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
339, 345 (1992) (“Counterfactual considerations intrude at many stages in legal factfinding 
and decisionmaking.  Sometimes we acknowledge their presence, but other times we remain 
unaware of them.  Sometimes counterfactuals help focus our inquiry, but other times they 
lead us astray.  Nevertheless, whether express or implicit, helpful or misleading, they are 
there.”). 
194. Zacks, supra note 9, at 210 (arguing that such provisions can induce adjudicators to 
make similar conclusions about which party is to “blame” for a particular contractual 
outcome or situation). 
195. BAUMEISTER, supra note 20, at 268 (“[T]here is some evidence that emotions 
stimulate counterfactual thinking, defined as imagining events or outcomes that differ from 
reality.”); Giorgio Coricelli & Aldo Rustichini, Counterfactual Thinking and Emotions: Regret 
and Envy Learning, 365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y. B 241, 246 (2010) (suggesting 
“an adaptive role of emotions, like regret and envy, which . . . .  proceed from a 
counterfactual consideration of outcomes”).  For example, it has been demonstrated that 
signing a document on the front page (as opposed to the end page) can increase a party’s 
honesty.  Lisa L. Shu et al., Signing at the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases 
Dishonest Self-Reports in Comparison to Signing at the End, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
15197, 15198 (2012). 
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trigger the anticipation of shame that would be associated with 
prospective counterfactual thinking (e.g., “If I challenge this contract, I 
will be shamed”). 
As discussed in this Part, the stakes are high for the contract 
preparer: the ex ante contract features, while profitable at the front end, 
can “increase delinquency and foreclosure rates,” which are costly at the 
back end.196  The balance for contract preparers is to create a contract 
that takes advantage of cognitive biases and other decision-making 
processes of contracting parties both at the time of contract formation as 
well as during the term of the contract.197  The contract needs to induce 
deference as written both for execution’s sake and for the sake of 
compliance and performance.198  As seen in the example of subprime 
mortgages, lenders may have succeeded in creating a contract that 
induced the ex ante contracting behavior desired while also being able to 
realize a lower level of strategic default than might otherwise be 
expected.199 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF SHAME AND REGRET 
The anticipation and experience of shame and regret ultimately may 
be about the resolution of conflict.200  At a fundamental level, the social 
strategies individuals employ are based on an understanding that other 
individuals are also pursuing the same goals (whether making gains or 
social alliances).201  Based on “[t]he inhibitory dimensions of 
shame . . . as a defensive strategy which can be triggered in the presence 
of an interpersonal threat,” one can better understand the strategic use 
of social signals inducing shame.202  In other words, subordinate 
 
196. Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1133–35. 
197. See supra Part III.E. 
198. See supra Part II.D. 
199. See Bar-Gill, supra note 9, at 1127 (arguing that the complex and multidimensional 
design of subprime mortgage contracts is purposefully exploitative of borrowers’ imperfect 
rationality); White, supra note 8, at 971–72 (describing the lower than expected level of 
default among underwater homeowners). 
200. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 101 (“In a straightforward contest, where 
there is likely to be a winner and a loser, the animal who loses requires a strategy that will 
inhibit (turn off) its challenging behavior. . . .  [T]he non-verbal communicative patterns of 
shame appear to be related to de-escalation in potential and actual conflict situations.”). 
201. Id. 
202. Id. (citing Paul Gilbert, The Evolution of Social Attractiveness and Its Role in 
Shame, Humiliation, Guilt and Therapy, 70 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 113 (1997)); see also 
Scheff, supra note 23, at 405 (concluding that “social control involves a biosocial system that 
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individuals do not spontaneously experience shame or anticipatory 
feelings of shame in a vacuum.  Rather, aggressive individuals attempt 
to induce others to submit.203  Without submission, the aggressive 
individuals would not “win” and achieve dominance.204  The signals the 
aggressive individuals send often can affect the physiological activity of 
the other, resulting in submissive behavior.205 
Contracts similarly address the resolution of current and future 
conflicts.206  Contracts detail current and future obligations and give a 
roadmap of how disputes will be handled, both procedurally (e.g., 
arbitration) and substantively (e.g., damages).207  Accordingly, contract 
preparers only achieve their desired contractual outcome by inducing 
submission by the other party.208  If contract preparers can “take” and 
induce individuals to “give up” and not contest or breach a particular 
contract, then they have established their dominance within the 
relationship (and more importantly, they have achieved their desired 
economic end).209  Social rank (powerful corporate actor versus small 
individual) also might be relevant, as dominant players “have much 
more power to make subordinates attune to their self-interests than the 
 
functions silently, continuously, and virtually invisibly, occurring within and between members 
of a society”). 
203. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 102 (“[I]t is not only aggression that 
determines dominance and rank structure but also the subordinate behaviors that are 
elicited.”). 
204. Id. (“If, and only if, the subordinate recognizes the relationship, or ‘predicts’ the 
outcome of an agonistic encounter by immediately showing submission, can we assume that a 
dominance relationship exists.” (quoting Irwin S. Bernstein, Dominance: A Theoretical 
Perspective for Ethologists, in DOMINANCE RELATIONS: AN ETHOLOGICAL VIEW OF 
HUMAN CONFLICT AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 71, 80 (Donald R. Omark et al. eds., 1980))). 
205. Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 106 (describing “[r]egulation-dysregulation 
theory (RDT)” as offering “insights into the ways that social signals, originating in the 
external world, impinge on and influence the biological state of the receiver(s),” which, in the 
case of social signals indicating that the individual is not acting properly, involve “atypical 
physiological and psychological states associated with symptoms (e.g., depression, anxiety, 
anger, boredom) and reduced capacities to concentrate and act efficiently” (citing Michael T. 
McGuire & Alfonso Troisi, Unrealistic Wishes and Physiological Change, 47 
PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 82 (1987))). 
206. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.3 (3d ed. 2004) (“The 
decision to recognize purely executory exchanges of promises also allowed the parties to 
engage in more sophisticated planning for the future.”); id. § 12.1 (“Our system of contract 
remedies . . . is aimed, instead, at relief to promisees to redress breach.”). 
207. Id. § 1.3. 
208. See Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 38, at 101. 
209. See id. at 101–02. 
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other way around.”210  If individuals believe they occupy a different rung 
on the social ladder than the contracting party (and there often is a 
disparity in bargaining and other power), then the contracting party may 
be in a better position to influence the other party’s behavior.211  This 
may be seen in the negotiation and execution stages of the contract, 
where the party not preparing the contract often defers to the written 
contract as written by the contract preparer.212 
As mentioned above, in addition to behaviors associated with the 
shame experience itself, another important part of shame behavior is 
shame avoidance.213  Despite urges to act differently, the anticipation of 
shame may deter individuals from acting in accordance with those 
urges.214  Similarly, one may withdraw from those situations where 
shame might be experienced, including situations involving asking for 
help.215  Although one may feel angry or frustrated in such situations (to 
cover up one’s shame), one is more likely to act aggressively from such 
anger or frustration from a superior social position.216  Thus, as between 
two contracting parties, the socially subordinate contracting party may 
be less likely to display anger upon feeling shame.217  Similarly, one who 
is afraid of feeling shame is unlikely to reveal or publicize the actions 
that involve a failure to measure up to others’ behavior.218   This is 
important because the goal of the contract preparer often will be 
 
210. Id. at 104. 
211. See Dov Cohen et al., The Sacred and the Social Cultures of Honor and Violence, in 
SHAME: INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE, supra note 21, 
at 261, 274 (describing cultures of honor where “deference must be paid to a person higher on 
the social ladder”). 
212. See Zacks, supra note 15, at 1474 (describing why parties sign contracts as 
presented, including the fact that many contracts are presented on a “take it or leave it” basis 
by an agent of the other party who does not appear to have the authority to negotiate or 
modify the terms). 
213. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 23 (“At this level, shame avoidance is a safety behavior no 
different in kind from that associated with any threat . . . .”); Gilbert & McGuire, supra note 
38, at 99 (describing shame as “an aversive experience . . . which people are highly motivated 
to avoid”). 
214. Macdonald, supra note 29, at 148 (stating that “[s]hamelike or embarrassing 
predicaments are . . . strong motivators of socially avoidant behavior”). 
215. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 23–24. 
216. Id. at 23 (“[D]ominant individuals can hide their shame in anger far easier than can 
subordinates.”). 
217. See id. 
218. Id. at 20 (“Social comparison and the anticipation of how others will evaluate and 
respond to negative information about the self also plays a crucial role in acts of revelation.”). 
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deference and compliance on the part of the other party, which suggests 
incorporating a difference in status explicitly into the contract.219 
As discussed in Part II supra, contract preparers may be rigging 
social strategies if the written contracts can send inaccurate or biased 
signals about how individuals should respond in particular situations in 
order to maintain their status within the community.220  In this way, 
contracts may reinforce a particular social hierarchy, at least with 
respect to the particular positions of the contract preparer versus the 
other contract party.221  Whether in the employer/employee context, the 
broker/client context, or the seller/consumer context, contracts may be 
more about reinforcing and even enlarging disparities in bargaining 
power as opposed to soliciting consensual agreements that are at worst 
neutral with respect to such issues.222  This Article suggests that such 
 
219. For more information, see supra Part II.B for a discussion regarding social status 
and the relevance of shame as well Part III.F for a discussion regarding the uses of authority.  
What is particularly interesting about shame responses in the contract situation is that the 
contract preparer and other contract party often are not face-to-face after the contract has 
been formed.  Thus, much of the emotional displays associated with shame (such as looking 
down or covering one’s face) are not available to the other contract party.  Instead, the only 
submission possible is the acquiescence to the contractual result as demanded by the contract 
preparer.  More importantly, the emotional displays associated with shame are only 
instructive with respect to the actual shame experience; as discussed below, it is likely that 
contract preparers rely on anticipatory feelings of shame with respect to inducing particular 
contractual behavior.  See infra text accompanying notes 225, 228.  In addition, individuals 
rely on others to provide indications or signals about what social strategies to use when 
negotiating acceptance within a group.  See infra text accompanying notes 226–27. 
220. See supra Part II.D. 
221. See Zacks, supra note 9, at 201. 
222. Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41 U. BALT. 
L. REV. 1, 66 (2011) (asserting that, under the “modern contract law system,” “[b]argaining 
power is increased via each contract the stronger party enters into, because the stronger party 
is able to reap more gains from each contract than it otherwise would with less bargaining 
power”).  Even the solutions designed to address bargaining power inequalities may be more 
effective at conveying a sense of successful reform as opposed to actually achieving it.  Id. at 
68, 77 (concluding that “compliance with [reforms such as] disclosure statutes will give the 
appearance that the quality of the weaker party’s mutual assent has increased, when in fact it 
has not. . . .  [Disclosure statutes] justify the [abuse] of power by the party with superior 
bargaining power both by masking the power imbalance embedded in the very structure of 
modern contract law and diverting critical attention and analysis away from that structure as a 
whole”); see also Zacks, supra note 9, at 223 (concluding that “reforms appear to be 
ineffective in modifying the actual contracting situation while reinforcing existing adjudicative 
biases.  This, in turn, precludes a deeper and more accurate examination of the contracting 
context.  If we are comfortable with reforms that make us feel better after the fact about the 
contracting context (regardless of effectiveness), then we are unlikely to search for evidence 
that the context was not as depicted by the contract’s content and presentation” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
ZACKS-FINAL (6-16-14) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2014  5:20 PM 
2014] SHAME, REGRET, AND CONTRACT DESIGN 745 
reinforcing behavior is elicited not at the contract negotiation or 
execution stage, but instead is at the post-formation stage, at which 
point much contracting behavior occurs.223  Moreover, these behaviors 
can be triggered, at least in part, by particular contract features.224 
On the other hand, shame may be seen as “an essential motivator” 
for desirable social behavior.225  The fear of shame can not only prevent 
illegal acts but also can motivate “altruistic” acts that reinforce the 
image of an individual as a valuable member of the group.226  Although it 
is doubtful that any particular person benefits from complying with their 
contract, at least from the perspective of whether the group accords such 
a person any additional respect or admiration, it may be that contract 
compliance is a prosocial behavior that permits more parties to engage 
in contract-making and the exchange of goods.227  If people cannot rely 
on the promises made within the contract, the argument may proceed, 
then contract preparers (often the “sellers”) may engage in fewer 
transactions with a smaller number of buyers (those who are personally 
known to be trustworthy), which would be damaging to the entire 
group.228 
Law, then, fills any void left by social pressure to ensure compliance 
with one’s contract.229  As long as the redress matched what the other 
 
223. See Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 7, at 208. 
224. See supra Part III.E. 
225. Greenwald & Harder, supra note 29, at 232. 
226. Id. 
227. See id. (stating that when shame encourages compliance with group norms, this 
creates “[p]rosocial behavior” which “helps to maintain mutually supportive relationships”). 
228. Robinson et al., supra note 43, at 1650–51 (“In the small groups in which humans 
have evolved, the marginal benefit of having each individual support punishment for 
wrongdoings might have reduced the number of transgressions in the group and, thus, 
protected an individual’s health, property, and ability to make contracts.”).  Robinson and 
colleagues note that “[t]his last element, contracts, is worth special consideration.”  Id. at 1651 
n.62.  They argue that “[b]ecause of humans’ abilities to represent abstract costs and benefits, 
the number of social exchanges that are possible is much, much larger than in other 
organisms . . . .  As the range of possible exchanges increases, the advantage of the ability to 
enforce contracts increases.”  Id.; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 206, § 1.3 (noting that 
“purely executory exchanges of promises did not become important in practice until a 
relatively advanced level of economic development had been attained”). 
229. BAUMEISTER, supra note 20, at 150 (“As cultures grow more elaborate and 
complex, social life consists of an increasing proportion of interactions with 
strangers. . . .  [P]eople are less motivated to treat each other properly when they do not 
expect ever to see each other again.”).  Baumeister describes how, accordingly, “to make 
people honor it the [financial] deal [between strangers] will usually be confirmed in some way 
that can be proven to be legally binding, such as a signed contract.”  Id. 
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bargained for (e.g., expectation damages, in many cases), then the 
contract arguably would have served its purpose, regardless of how 
many individuals actually breach their contracts.230  As argued in this 
Article, however, contract preparers may utilize social pressures and the 
anticipation of shame or guilt to influence a party’s compliance with the 
contract, particularly if the legal and economic incentives for the other 
party suggest non-compliance as a viable option.  In other words, one’s 
attributions about her own behavior help determine her emotional and 
behavioral responses to a situation.231  The written contract may 
accomplish this through the inclusion of multiple signature blocks, a 
formal legal appearance, boldface type for disclaimers, reliance 
language, and other features discussed in this Article.232 
V. CONCLUSION 
By reinforcing the social norm of contract as sacred promise and 
anticipating the negative emotions, cognitive biases, and judgment 
heuristics of the other parties, contract preparers (often corporate 
actors) can enjoy the other party’s contract compliance or deference 
(even if not mandated by the legal regime), while still relying on the 
flexibility of the legal regime to abandon contract compliance on their 
own behalf when economically beneficial.233 
One possible benefit to the growing public awareness of human 
behavior and its manipulability is the additional caution individuals may 
exercise when making particular decisions.  As individuals become more 
 
230. See Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 408. 
231. LEARY, supra note 177, at 97 (“The same harmful event may produce different 
emotional reactions depending on how people talk to themselves about what they have 
done.”). 
232. See supra Part III.E. 
233. See White, supra note 8, at 1023 (“Individuals should not be artificially discouraged 
on the basis of ‘morality’ from making financially prudent decisions, particularly when the 
party on the other side is amorally operating according to market norms and could have acted 
to protect itself by following prudent underwriting practices.”); Gregory M. Gilchrist, The 
Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 29 (2012) (concluding that 
“[c]orporations do not have autonomy or emotionality. . . .  They do not deserve blame 
because they lack the volitional capacities we associate with moral blameworthiness”); 
Kenneth R. Harney, The Moral Dimensions of Ditching a Mortgage, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 
2009, at E1 (quoting Fannie Mae spokesman Brian Faith, who indicated that “there’s a moral 
dimension to this as homeowners who simply abandon their homes contribute to the 
destabilization of their neighborhood and community” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Because they lack these volitional capacities, corporations may act without regard to the 
possible shame associated with blameworthy actions such as breaching a contractual (and 
moral) promise. 
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aware of what contract preparers do in order to induce them to act in a 
particular manner after the contract has been formed, perhaps 
individuals will become more careful actors when considering a possible 
adverse course of action with respect to their contracts.  If regret 
aversion can be diminished and knowledge of actual social practices and 
norms (versus perceived and artificially constructed social practices and 
norms) can be increased, then contract preparers will be less advantaged 
by undetected current contract-preparation methodology.234  For 
example, if the public was aware that contract preparers were aware of 
the biased portrayal of contractual breach, perhaps the decision 
regarding whether to breach or challenge the contract would not appear 
so fraught with peril.  A more informed and perhaps more cynical 
contracting public may be better prepared to respond to such provisions 
when encountered in the future.  Given the limited success, however, of 
“awareness campaigns” in addressing market-driven strategies by more 
powerful actors or otherwise changing behavior, it is nevertheless 
dubious to presume that a more informed public will be better equipped 
when making post-contract formation decisions, particularly given the 
unconscious or uncontrollable aspects of the shame experience.235 
Because of the complicated and, in some cases, unpredictable, 
nature of the emotional and cognitive processes involved in human 
decision-making, this Article does not contemplate or describe a 
panacea for economically irrational actions or decisions in the ex post 
contracting context, such as regulatory oversight of the contract 
preparation for “troubling” provisions.236  Indeed, in the absence of 
empirical data demonstrating that the critique laid out in this Article is 
in fact accurate and predictable, it is not desirable to attempt to insert a 
“better” decision-maker for the contracting party.  As has been noted 
elsewhere, it would be difficult to imagine a centralized approach, 
directed also by fallible individuals, that would enable decision-makers 
to “weigh all the economic, scientific, and psychological evidence 
objectively, to stand on nuanced distinctions, and to adopt policies that 
 
234. See supra Part III.C (discussing how contract preparers can take advantage of the 
contract signer’s desire to avoid regret). 
235. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 3, at 669; see also, e.g., id. at 731. 
236. Accordingly, “individuals [may] more or less ‘rationally’ choose to take these non-
material, psychological consequences into account” to satisfy “certain needs, although these 
needs are non-material.”  Zeelenberg, supra note 29, at 331. 
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carefully target just those people who need help most.”237  If others 
cannot “fix” or “optimize” individual decision-making tendencies, and 
the solution is not individual knowledge itself, then one is left to 
contemplate whether the existing system can be remedied at all.  
Perhaps one “should expect policies to be blunt instruments,” but that 
does not necessarily dictate comfort with such policies being utilized or 
manipulated only by one of the affected parties.238 
Nevertheless, the limits and exploitation of human cognition with 
respect to ex post contract decision-making is important for 
understanding contract preparation and contemplating possible 
reforms.239  This in turn may undermine the perceived sanctity of a 
written contract as moral promise.  From an economic standpoint, 
undermining such perceptions may be desirable if contracts contain 
provisions that, if not breached or challenged, threaten the economic 
well-being of the greater society.  For example, if more homeowners had 
strategically defaulted on their subprime mortgages earlier, perhaps the 
mortgage crisis would not have been as prolonged or as damaging 
(because fewer mortgages would have been originated or at least would 
have been rated more accurately based upon their risk of default).  One 
can imagine similar conclusions for the next unknown contracting-
related crisis.  If individuals feel constrained by social norm 
considerations (reinforced by the written contract) from breaching or 
contesting economically one-sided or illegal contracts, then such 
contracts and their associated transactions will presumably proliferate, 
with possibly severe consequences. 
It may be, of course, that it is the very “moral” nature of the 
promises made in written contract that help deter undesirable breaches, 
regardless of contract law’s general disposition that monetary damages 
are appropriate to compensate for breaches.240  If monetary damages 
 
237. Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother Is Watching You: New 
Paternalism on the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 685, 737 (2009). 
238. Id. at 737.  Rizzo and Whitman are concerned about paternalism that does “not 
clearly distinguish private, voluntary efforts from public, mandatory ones,” which, as a bright-
line test, would provide part of a “bulwark against the problems of vagueness, including the 
threat of slippery slopes.”  Id. at 739. 
239. Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 259 (concluding that, although “the limits of cognition 
are not a universal explanation of either contract law or the limits of contract,” the “[o]ther 
teachings of experience, as well as concepts of efficiency and morality . . . can be given 
appropriate weight only when we know the psychological framework within which actors 
operate when making choices”). 
240. See Goetz & Keltner, supra note 44, at 166. 
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generally do not compensate an aggrieved party fully for a breach 
(whether because of the time involved in litigating a dispute or the 
inability of the legal system to ascertain the actual amount of loss 
suffered), then perhaps “our legal system works better . . . by relying on 
moral forces, such as they are, to fill the gap in inducing appropriate 
performance.”241 
Without accepting or denying this assertion as a general proposition, 
my response is that this Article is not addressing the role of morality 
with respect to written contracts generally.  Instead, this Article 
examines whether contract preparers can anticipate and exploit 
individuals’ moral and emotional impulses regarding breach to their 
advantage.  In other words, general moral sentiments regarding breach 
may be beneficial in the abstract to ensure that most people perform 
their promises, but this contention only has validity if all contracting 
parties are playing by the same sentimental rules.  As seen in this 
Article, contract preparers depict a world in which contractual promises 
have a moral component, are specifically sought and enforced, and are 
rarely challenged or breached, while those same contract preparers 
make their own contracting decisions based on a more basic, if real, 
economic calculus. 
 
241. Shavell, supra note 64, at 460; see also Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 11, at 
421 (noting that individuals’ responses to breaches can be influenced by the belief “that 
breaking a contractual promise is a moral violation, [so] it is reasonable to think that 
breachers should not be permitted to profit (above the expected benefit of the contract) from 
their intentional bad act”). 
